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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2006, Taiwan officially adopted the independent director 
mechanism for the purpose of promoting corporate governance and 
improving corporate health.1  More than ten years have passed since 
this change to the Securities Exchange Act (“SEA”) and yet some 
doubts still persist in public at large regarding the roles and 
functions of independent directors.  Paragraph 1, Article 14-2 of the 
SEA provides that: 
 
† Professor of Law, National Taipei University. 
 1 The introduction of independent directors in Taiwan intends to resolve statutory 
supervisors’ failure and effectively monitor board of directors. For relevant discussions on 
introduction of independent directors in Taiwan, please see Hsin-Ti Chang, Yu-Hsin Lin & 
Ying-Hsin Tsai, From Double Board to Unitary Board System—Independent Directors 
and Corporate Governance Reform in Taiwan, in INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR IN ASIA-A 
HISTORICAL, CONTEXTUAL AND COMPARATIVE APPROACH 241-245 (Dan W. Puchniak, 
Harald Baum & Luke Nottage eds., 2017). 
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[a] company that has issued stock in accordance with 
this Act may appoint independent directors in 
accordance with its articles of incorporation.  The 
Competent Authority, however, shall, as necessary, 
in view of the company’s scale, shareholder structure, 
type of operations, and other essential factors, require 
it to appoint independent directors, not less than two 
in number and not less than one-fifth of the total 
number of directors.2 
The competent authority, Financial Supervisory Commission 
(“FSC”), compulsorily requires all non-financial Taiwan Stock 
Exchange (“TWSE”)-Listed and Taipei Exchange(“TPEx”)-Listed 
companies along with firms in the financial industry to appoint 
independent directors at a number of no fewer than two or a ratio of 
not less than one-fifth the total number of directors on the board.3  
For traded companies on the non-financial Emerging Stock Board 
(“ESB”), 4 such compulsory appointment of independent directors 
shall be applied no later than January 1st, 2020.5 
A 2017 study reveals that as of October 2014, 35.87% of all 
companies among TWSE/TPEx-Listed companies had two 
independent directors on their boards and 29.43% had three 
independent directors. 6   The SEA requires that boards of public 
companies in Taiwan have a minimum of five directors.7  Therefore, 
 
 2 Paragraph 1, Article 14-2 of the Securities Exchange Act. See SEC. EXCHANGE ACT 
(June 21, 2019) (Taiwan), FAWUBU FAGUI ZILIAOKU (全國法規資料庫 ) [Laws and 
Regulations Database of the Republic of China], 
https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=G0400001 
[https://perma.cc/J5QS-CR4P]. 
 3 TPEx-Listed companies are originally known as Over-The-Counter-Traded 
companies in Taiwan. 
 4 In addition to the Main Board, Taipei Exchange (the OTC market) established an 
Emerging Stock Board in 2013. For more details about the Emerging Stock Board, see 
TAIPEI EXCHANGE, LISTING REQUIREMENTS AND PROCEDURES,  
https://www.tpex.org.tw/web/service/sotck_info/feature/promote_issuer.php?l=en-us 
[https://perma.cc/MC88-T9AS] (last visited Jan. 28, 2019). 
 5 FIN. SUPERVISORY COMMISSION, ORDER NO. FINANCIAL-SUPERVISOR-SECURITIES-I-
1070345233 (Dec. 19, 2018), https://eng.selaw.com.tw/LetterContent.aspx?Soid=177 
[https://perma.cc/HRU3-46RT]. 
 6 CHANG, LIN & TSAI, supra note 1, at 251. 
 7 Article 26-3 of the Securities Exchange Act provides that “The board of directors 
of a company that has issued stock in accordance with the Act may not number less than 
five persons . . . “ See SEC. EXCHANGE ACT, supra note 2, at art. 26-3. 
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based on the above numbers, we can estimate that of all the 
companies listed on the TWSE/TPEx, few of the boards have a 
majority of independent directors.  In fact, according to the 
information disclosed on the Market Observation Post System 
(“MOPS”) of the TWSE, as of December 2017, out of a group of 
919 TWSE-Listed companies indicating two or more independent 
directors on their boards, 31 of them had four independent directors, 
five had five independent directors, and only two had six 
independent directors.8  For those companies with more than four 
independent directors, only 11 of them had a majority of 
independent directors on the board,9 which is a mere 1.2% of all 
TWSE-Listed companies.  Therefore, the crux of the matter is how 
independent directors in Taiwan, who are in the minority on most 
boards, can perform their tasks well in this challenging environment 
and achieve the aim of promoting corporate governance and 
improving corporate health. 
Randy J. Holland, former Justice of Delaware Supreme 
Court, has pointed out that independent directors have two major 
functions: to make inquiries and to veto. 10   Under the current 
independent director mechanism in Taiwan, despite the difficulties 
faced by independent directors for taking the lead in directing or 
channeling the results of board decisions, they can still play an 
important role in monitoring activities and delivering outside 
independent opinions.  The performance of these activities, however, 
is under pressure from additional challenges facing independent 
directors—Namely, independent directors are subject to limited 
information and restraints on time, along with an excessive 
dependence on the provision of information by company 
management.  This reliance on information controlled by company 
management has led some to speculate that outside directors merely 
receive selective information that would support management’s 
desired position on any given matter.  As a result, instead of acting 
as a check against potential managerial indiscretion, “[o]utside 
directors may see major issues confronting the corporation through 
 
 8 https://mops.twse.com.tw/mops/web/index [https://perma.cc/5WK2-8H3G] 
(Market Observation Post System 公開資訊觀測站, Chinese). 
 9 https://mops.twse.com.tw/mops/web/t93sb05 [https://perma.cc/UZU4-MY4P] 
(Market Observation Post System 公開資訊觀測站, Chinese). 
 10 Randy J. Holland spoke at the meeting of Taiwan Academy of Banking and 
Finance on December 3rd, 2008. 
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management’s eyes.” 11   Therefore, if they are to fulfill their 
fiduciary duties, then independent directors need to make inquiries, 
deliver contrary opinions, assert reservations, or act as a veto on the 
board.  
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the monitoring 
activity provided for by independent directors in Taiwan, this study 
reviews dissenting opinions delivered by independent directors.  
Dissenting opinion for the purposes of this paper means an opinion 
of reservation or a veto delivered by an independent director on the 
board or committee and disclosed on the MOPS in accordance to the 
relevant laws and regulations.  This empirical study analyzes the 
following issues:(1) the number and distribution of dissenting 
opinions delivered by independent directors; (2) the reasons for such 
dissenting opinions; (3) the responses by boards for which 
independent directors delivered dissenting opinions; and, (4) the 
possible correlation between the delivery of dissenting opinions by 
independent directors and their re-elections. 
There exists, however, certain unavoidable limitations to this 
empirical study.  First, in practice, it is common practice in Taiwan 
to have an “informal meeting” to exchange opinions before the 
formal board meeting, but such informal meetings will not have 
formal minutes and are not required by law to publish dissenting 
opinions, if any, by independent directors.  Second, under the 
existing laws and regulations, dissenting opinions delivered on an 
audit committee are not subject to the disclosure requirement.  
Hence, the dissenting opinions collected in this paper are limited to 
those disclosed on the MOPS, and thus, there will likely be fewer 
dissenting opinions delivered by independent directors reviewed in 
this paper than those that may have actually been delivered on 
various occasions. 
The remaining parts of this paper are as follows: Part II 
introduces the relevant laws and regulations governing the 
disclosure of dissenting opinions delivered by independent directors 
in Taiwan.  Part III presents the results derived from this empirical 
study.  Part IV assesses certain implications garnered from the 
results of this empirical study, including insufficiencies with respect 
to information or disclosures.  Part V provides concluding remarks. 
 
 11 Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governance 
Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 898, 914 (1995-1996). 
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II. RELEVANT REGULATIONS IN TAIWAN ON THE 
DISSENTING OPINIONS OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS 
Under current Taiwanese law, independent directors are 
seated on company boards and audit committees, but their seats on 
remuneration committees are, to an extent, optional.  Article 193 of 
The Company Act provides that: 
[(Paragraph 1) t]he Board of Directors, in conducting 
business, shall act in accordance with laws and 
ordinances, the Articles of Incorporation, and the 
resolutions adopted at the meetings of shareholders.  
[Paragraph 2]  Where any resolution adopted by the 
Board of Directors contravenes the preceding 
Paragraph, thereby causing loss or damage to the 
company, all directors taking part in the adoption of 
such resolution shall be liable to compensate the 
company for such loss or damage; however, those 
directors whose dissenting opinion appears on record 
or is expressed in writing shall be exempted from 
liability.12 
Accordingly, for an independent director to be exempted 
from liability, his/her dissenting opinion should either be expressed 
in writing or appear on record.  In addition, Paragraph 1, Article 14-
3 of the SEA sets forth that when a company has selected 
independent directors, certain matters, such as the adoption or 
amendment of an internal control system; the adoption or 
amendment of procedures for handling financial or operational 
actions of material significance; a matter bearing on the personal 
interest of a director or supervisor; a material asset or derivatives 
transaction; a material monetary loans, endorsements or provisions 
of guarantee; the offerings, issuance, or private placements of any 
equity-type security; the hiring or dismissal of an attesting CPA, the 
compensation given thereto; and, the appointment or discharge of a 
 
 12 Article 193 of the Company Act. See COMPANY ACT art. 193 (Aug. 1, 2018) 
(Taiwan), FAWUBU FAGUI ZILIAOKU (全國法規資料庫) [Laws and Regulations Database 
of the Republic of China],  
https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=J0080001 
[https://perma.cc/HJ2H-5HZ8] [hereinafter Audit Committee Regulations] 
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financial, accounting, or internal auditing officer, etc. shall be 
submitted to the board of directors for approval by resolution unless 
approval has already been obtained from the FSC.  When an 
independent director has a dissenting opinion on any such matters, it 
shall be noted in the minutes of the directors meeting.13 
Moreover, every independent director on the board 
automatically becomes a member of the audit committee under the 
SEA (namely, the audit committee shall be composed of the entire 
number of independent directors).14  However, the authority of the 
audit committee on critical issues is weak as a result of the board’s 
ability to, in most cases, usurp its authority.  Specifically, in most 
cases, a board has the power to overrule decisions of an audit 
committee by passage of a resolution supported by two-thirds or 
more of all directors.15  In such cases, where an audit committee’s 
decision has been essentially disregarded, the only option available 
to the committee is to record the board’s reversal of its decision in 
the board-meeting minutes with the hope that public scrutiny will 
offer some sanction.16  Paragraph 1, Article 10 of the Regulations 
Governing the Exercise of Powers by Audit Committees of Public 
Companies provides that: 
[d]iscussion at an audit committee meeting shall be 
included in the meeting minutes, which shall 
faithfully record the following: . . . 7. Agenda items: 
 
 13 Article 14-3 of the SEA provides that “When a company has selected independent 
directors as set forth in paragraph 1 of the preceding article, then the following matters 
shall be submitted to the board of directors for approval by resolution unless approval has 
been obtained from the Competent Authority; and when an independent director has a 
dissenting opinion or reservation opinion, it shall be noted in the minutes of the directors 
meeting: 1. Adoption or amendment of an internal control system pursuant to Article 14-1; 
2. Adoption or amendment, pursuant to Article 36-1, of handling procedures for financial 
or operational actions of material significance, such as acquisition or disposal of assets, 
derivatives trading, extension of monetary loans to others, or endorsements or guarantees 
for others; 3. A matter bearing on the personal interest of a director or supervisor; 4. A 
material asset or derivatives transaction; 5. A material monetary loan, endorsement, or 
provision of guarantee; 6. The offering, issuance, or private placement of any equity-type 
securities; 7. The hiring or dismissal of an attesting CPA, or the compensation given 
thereto; 8. The appointment or discharge of a financial, accounting, or internal auditing 
officer; 9. Any other material matter so required by the Competent Authority.” See SEC. 
EXCHANGE ACT, supra note 2, at art. 14-3. 
 14 SEC. EXCHANGE ACT, supra note 2, at art. 14-4. 
 15 SEC. EXCHANGE ACT, supra note 2, at art. 14-5. 
 16 CHANG, LIN & TSAI, supra note 1, at 257-258. 
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resolution method and result of each proposal; 
summary of the comments made by the independent 
director members on the audit committee . . . ; the 
name of any independent director member possibly 
having an interest relationship . . . ; and any 
objections or reservations expressed at the meeting.17 
Independent director membership on remuneration 
committees, under Taiwan laws, is not fully compulsory.  Paragraph 
3, Article 8 of the Regulations Governing the Appointment and 
Exercise of Powers by the Remuneration Committee of a Company 
Whose Stock is Listed on the Stock Exchange or Traded Over the 
Counter (“Remuneration Committee Regulations”) provides that: 
[w]hen a company has selected independent directors 
in accordance with the SEA, at least one independent 
director shall participate on the remuneration 
committee, although other qualified independent 
experts might also be the members of remuneration 
committee, and the entire membership shall 
unanimously elect the independent director to serve 
as the convener and meeting chair.”18 
 
 17 See Gongkai Faxing Gongsi Shenji Weiyuanhui Xingshi Zhiquan Banfa (公開發行
公司審計委員會行使職權辦法) [Regulations Governing the Exercise of Powers by Audit 
Committees of Public Companies] art. 10 (promulgated by Fin. Supervisory Commission, 
R.O.C (Taiwan), Mar. 28, 2006, effective Jan. 1, 2007; rev’d by Fin. Supervisory 
Commission, R.O.C (Taiwan), July 28, 2017), 
https://law.fsc.gov.tw/law/EngLawContent.aspx?lan=E&id=2072 [https://perma.cc/H3B4-
MFD7] 
 18 The qualifications for independent experts on the remuneration committee are 
exactly the same as those for independent directors set forth in the Articles 2 and 3 of the 
Regulations Governing Appointment of Independent Directors and Compliance Matters for 
Public Companies. See REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE APPOINTMENT AND EXERCISE OF 
POWERS BY THE REMUNERATION COMMITTEE OF A COMPANY WHOSE STOCK IS LISTED ON 
THE STOCK EXCHANGE OR TRADED OVER THE COUNTER (股票上市或於證券商營業處所買
賣公司薪資報酬委員會設置及行使職權辦法) art. 5 & art 6 (Aug. 27, 2015) (Taiwan), 
FAWUBU FAGUI ZILIAOKU (全國法規資料庫) [Laws and Regulations Database of the 
Republic of China],  
https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=G0400149 
[https://perma.cc/KU8K-3B5E] [hereinafter Remuneration Committee Regulations]. 
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General practice for most TWSE/TPEx-Listed companies is 
for all independent directors to be members of the remuneration 
committee. 
Decisions of remuneration committees, like those of audit 
committees, cannot be considered final as they are subject to being 
overruled by the board via the consent of a majority of the directors 
in attendance at a meeting attended by two-thirds or more of the 
entire board.19  If the remuneration decisions passed by the board of 
directors exceed a recommendation by the remuneration committee, 
then the circumstances and causes for the difference shall be 
specified in the board meeting minutes, and shall be publicly 
announced and reported on the information reporting website 
designated by the competent authority within two days from the 
date of passage by the board of directors.20  Furthermore, Article 10 
of the Remuneration Committee Regulations sets forth that: 
[m]inutes shall be prepared of the discussions at the 
remuneration committee, and the minutes shall 
record the matters listed below in a detailed and 
accurate manner: . . . 7. Agenda items: the resolution 
method and outcome of each motion, and any 
objections or reservations expressed by any 
committee member . . . If with respect to any 
resolution of the remuneration committee, any 
member has a dissenting or reservation opinion that 
is on record or stated in a written statement, the 
opinion shall be stated in the meeting minutes, and 
additionally, within two days counting inclusively 
from the date of occurrence, shall be publicly 
disclosed and reported on the information reporting 
website designated by the competent authority.21  
To sum up, under Taiwan’s existing laws and regulations, 
only the dissenting opinions delivered by independent directors on 
the board and/or by independent experts on the remuneration 
committee must be reported and disclosed on the MOPS.  The 
dissenting opinions delivered on the audit committee are not subject 
 
 19 Id. 
 20 REMUNERATION COMMITTEE REGULATIONS, supra note 18, at art. 7 §§5-6. 
 21 REMUNERATION COMMITTEE REGULATIONS, supra note 18, at art. 10. 
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to such a disclosure requirement due to the high sensitivity and 
confidential nature of matters of audit committee meetings.  In light 
of this condition, the dissenting opinions delivered by independent 
directors or independent experts on company boards and/or 
remuneration committees are selected as the focus for this empirical 
study. 
III. THE RESULTS OF THIS EMPIRICAL STUDY 
This empirical study surveys the dissenting opinions 
delivered by independent directors of all TWSE and TPEx-Listed, 
including ESB-Traded companies, and disclosed on the MOPS for a 
five-year period, from 2013 to 2017.  Since there is no category for 
dissenting opinions of independent directors on the MOPS, this 
study employed keywords (“independent director”, “dissenting 
opinion”, “reservation opinion”, “veto”, or “different opinion”) to 
capture the relevant data on the MOPS website.  For purposes of 
calculation in this study, it should be noted that multiple opinions 
delivered by the same independent director in a single board 
meeting could be assessed as separate instances, such as an 
independent director being counted as delivering two dissenting 
opinions for a single board meeting when these opinions were for 
two separate agenda items.  Similarly, two individual independent 
directors that have dissenting opinions for the same agenda item at 
the same board meeting will also be counted as having two 
dissenting opinions, and so on.  Additionally, dissenting opinions 
delivered by independent experts were also included in the count 
due to the fact that the legal qualifications for an independent expert 
on a remuneration committee are exactly the same as those of an 
independent director. 
A. Number of Independent Director Dissenting Opinions 
During the five-year period of this study from 2013 to 2017, 
there are 86 dissenting opinions delivered by independent directors 
for TWSE-Listed Companies, 62 for TPEx-Listed companies, and 
13 for ESB-Traded companies.  The distribution by different years 
and types of companies is indicated by Table 1 and Chart 1 below. 
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Table 1: The Number and Distribution of Dissenting Opinions of 
Independent Directors  
Year 
TWSE-Listed  TPEx-Listed ESB-Traded 
Total 
No. of dissenting 
opinions of ID/ 
total no. of TWSE-
Listed 
companies22 
No. of dissenting 
opinions of ID/ 
total no. of 
TPEx-Listed 
companies23 
No. of dissenting 
opinions of ID/ 
total no. of ESB-
Traded 
companies24 
2013 6 / 838 10 / 658 0 / 261 16 
2014 0 / 854 6 / 685 1 / 284 7 
2015 12 / 874 2 / 712 5 / 284  19 
2016 22 / 892 19 / 732 3 / 271 44 
2017 46 / 907 25 / 744 4 / 274 75 
Total 86 62 13 161 
 
Chart 1: The Distribution of Dissenting Opinions of Independent 
Directors 
 
 
 22 TAIWAN STOCK EXCHANGE, SUMMARY DATA OF STOCK MARKET (BY YEAR) 
ANNUAL STATISTICS,  
https://www.twse.com.tw/en/statistics/statisticsList?type=07&subType=232 
[https://perma.cc/T4XA-NYV9] (last visited Apr. 26, 2018). 
 23 TAIPEI EXCHANGE, HISTORICAL DATA AND STATISTICS FOR TPEX LISTED STOCKS, 
https://www.tpex.org.tw/web/stock/statistics/monthly/monthly_rpt_mkt_info_02.php?l=en-
us [https://perma.cc/CK9T-BQAX] (last visited Apr. 26, 2018). 
 24 TAIPEI EXCHANGE, INDICATORS OF TPEX, 
https://www.tpex.org.tw/web/bulletin/statistics/statistics.php?l=en-us 
[https://perma.cc/J3J8-MLU3] (last visited Apr. 26, 2018). 
TWSE-Listed TPEx-Listed ESB-Traded
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First, with respect to the numeric data, the number of 
dissenting opinions over the five-year period was distributed across 
50 different companies. 25  Among these 50 companies, 23 were 
TWSE-Listed, 18 TPEx-Listed, and 9 ESB-Traded.26 
Second, with respect to the diachronic data as illustrated by 
the timeline for Figure 1, the incidence of dissenting opinions 
delivered by independent directors went up in each ensuing year 
(except for 2014) for all TWSE/TPEx-Listed and ESB-Traded 
companies, with dramatic upticks in both 2016 and 2017 for 
TWSE/TPEx-Listed companies.  This increase could be indicative 
of increased awareness by independent directors of their fiduciary 
duty as well as their liabilities therefrom. 
Third, with respect to company type, independent directors 
in the TPEx-Listed companies delivered more dissenting opinions 
than in the TWSE-Listed companies at the early stage of the five-
year period, such as 2013 and 2014.  This can be explained by the 
practice for multiple independent directors in a TPEx-Listed 
company to usually deliver their dissenting opinions in collective 
actions, for example, three independent directors registering 
opposition to the same single agenda item would count for three 
different dissent opinions, making the overall number of dissenting 
opinions statistically higher.  In recent years, however, the 
dissenting opinions for independent directors of TWSE-Listed 
Companies were more than those of TPEx-Listed companies both in 
terms of instance and ratio.  For example, as illustrated in Table 1, 
the ratio between the number of dissenting opinions of independent 
directors and the total number of TWSE-Listed companies was 2.5% 
(22/892) in 2016 and 5% (46/907) in 2017 respectively; while such 
ratio was 2.5% (19/732) and 3.4% (25/744) for TPEx-Listed 
companies and 1.1% (3/271) and 1.5% (4/274) for ESB-Traded 
companies.  Therefore, we can infer that independent directors in 
the TWSE-Listed companies became more active in delivering their 
dissenting opinions in recent years. 
 
 25 The average number of all TWSE/TPEx-Listed and ESB-Traded companies during 
the five-year period was 1855. 
 26 See infra Appendix pp. 26-49. 
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Figure 1: The Number of Dissenting Opinions Delivered by Independent 
Directors. 
Lastly, the report of the Budget Center of Taiwan’s 
Legislative Yuan indicated that as of July 2017 there was a total of 
2391 independent directors for all TWSE-Listed and 1832 
independent directors for all TPEx-Listed companies.27  Among the 
total 4223 independent directors in both TWSE/TPEx-Listed 
companies, only 48 independent directors accounted for the 71 
dissenting opinions delivered in 2017.28  That makes for a ratio of 
1.1% (48/4223), which means that for every 100 independent 
directors only 1.1 delivered dissenting opinions.  Based on this data, 
the delivery of a dissenting opinion by an independent director in 
Taiwan can still be considered a novelty. 
 
 27 Lin Tengyao (林騰鷂), Xieren Zhengwuguan Buyi Ren Dudong (卸任政務官不宜
任 獨 董 ) [Retired Board Directors Shall Not Be Independent Directors], 
CHINATIMES.COM ( 中 時 電 子 報 ) (Apr. 9, 2018, 04:11 AM), 
https://www.chinatimes.com/cn/newspapers/20180409000630-260109?chdtv 
[https://perma.cc/D55Q-6C6X]. 
 28 See infra Appendix. 
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B. Reasons for Independent Director Dissenting Opinions 
The empirical data assessed in this study demonstrates a 
diverse variety of reasons for dissenting opinions delivered by 
independent directors as a result of the array of complicated 
company management and supervision structures.  Evidence for this 
came, for example, from dissenting opinions surrounding issues 
such as a proposal to increase the distribution of cash dividends, a 
proposal to establish a nomination committee, and a vote against 
certain investments associated with high risks, to name a few.  
Nevertheless, this study revealed that among the various reasons for 
dissenting opinions delivered by independent directors, the most 
common ones centered around “insufficient information” and others 
of a similar nature, including “the company did not provide 
directors with relevant materials”; “the meeting was arranged with 
short notice and directors did not have sufficient time and 
opportunity to study the pros and cons of this project”; “the decision 
was made in haste without comprehensive discussion”; “some items 
needed to be further audited”; “there was no evaluation and no 
feasibility study for the investment project”; “the proposal needs the 
assistance of other professionals”; “the professional person should 
be present and make a report in the board meeting”; and so on.  This 
study finds that such “insufficient information” or similar reasons 
accounted for 16.8% out of all the dissenting opinions delivered by 
independent directors (Please see Table 2). 
 
Table 2: “Insufficient Information” as the Reason for Dissenting 
Opinions Delivered by Independent Directors  
 
 TWSE-
Listed 
TPEx-
Listed 
ESB-
Traded Total 
Insufficient 
information 
15/86 
(17.4%) 
7/62 
(11.3%) 
5/13 
(38.5%) 
27/161 
(16.8%) 
  
This 16.8% number corresponds closely to the result from an 
August 2009 questionnaire-based survey conducted by Professor 
Len-Yu Liu.  Liu’s study sent out 585 questionnaires to independent 
directors of TWSE-Listed companies and got back 276 replies.  
Based on the replies received, 18% of the independent directors 
thought that the key factor having the most negative influence on 
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the performance of their duties was “the obstacle of access to 
information”, which ranked second overall among the negative 
factors listed.29  The percentage for TWSE-Listed companies in the 
present study was 17.4% as shown in Table 2, which is even closer 
to the above 18% result of Liu’s questionnaire.  Data suggest that in 
the ten-year period following the 2009 questionnaire, there was little 
to no improvement in the problem of insufficient information for 
independent directors.  The implication of this points to the 
necessity of ensuring access by independent directors to sufficient 
and adequate information; and, to work on ways to strengthen their 
rights to secure information and the inspection of company records, 
both of which should form the cornerstone for the effective 
performance of the duties envisioned by the independent director 
mechanism. 
Companies’ lack of disclosure or explanation for the reasons 
of independent director’s dissenting opinion is another matter of 
note.  Many companies simply neglect to fill-in the “Reason Item” 
required on the MOPS.  Lax enforcement of disclosure requirements 
leads to incomplete market information as well as a lack of 
precision for investors trying to analyze and interpret the basis of 
any dissenting opinions, defeating the objective of full disclosure 
for public oversight. Regrettably, failures to elaborate and explain 
have been all too common, as indicated by Table 3 where 22.4% of 
all dissenting opinions delivered by independent directors in this 
study neglected to provide any reasons or explanations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 29 The question is “Based on your experience as an independent director, which of the 
followings do you think is the key factor that has negative influence on performing your 
duties as an independent director? (A) obstacle of access to information (18%); (B) 
personal relationship (10%); (C) insufficient remuneration, no incentive (7%); (D) 
insufficient time to devote (28%); (E) lack of professional ability, no effective monitoring 
(7%); (F) insufficient monitoring due to expectation of re-election (1%); (G) no problem at 
all (57%).” Len-Yu Liu (劉連煜), Duli Dongshi Shi Shaoshu Gudong Zhi Shouhushen?—
Taiwan Shangshi Shanggui Gongsi Duli Dongshi Zhidu Zhi Jiantao Yu Jianyi (獨立董事
是少數股東之守護神？—台灣上市上櫃公司獨立董事制度之檢討與建議) [Is the 
Independent Director a Patron Saint of Minority Shareholders? A Review and Proposal of 
the Independent Director Mechanism in TWSE/TPEx-Listed Companies in Taiwan], 26 
CROSS-STRAIT L. REV. (月旦民商法雜誌) 29, 36-37 (2009). 
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Table 3: No Explanation for Reasons Associated with the 
Dissenting Opinions Delivered by Independent Directors 
 
 TWSE-
Listed  
TPEx-
Listed 
ESB-
Traded Total 
No 
Explanation 
17/86 
(19.8%) 
13/62 
(21%) 
6/13 
(46.2%) 
36/161 
(22.4%) 
 
The findings shown in Table 3 illustrate how ESB-Traded 
companies appear to be the most serious violators of the 
requirement to post explanations: 46.2% of ESB-Traded companies 
failed to disclose the reasons for the dissenting opinions of their 
independent directors.  This points to the substantial room for 
improvement needed in the enforcement of full disclosure by the 
competent authority. 
C. Responses to Independent Director Dissenting Opinions 
The issue underpinning this study is the extent to which 
dissenting opinions impact the decisions of the board and whether 
they can even affect the outcomes of board resolutions.  An 
important index for both measuring the effectiveness of dissenting 
opinions and evaluating the functioning of the independent director 
mechanism in Taiwan is the reaction to them by boards, that is to 
say the board response elicited by the dissenting opinions of their 
independent directors. 
Based on the data collected on the MOPS, this study 
classifies board meeting responses, for example, the positions a 
company takes in reaction to dissenting opinions delivered by 
independent directors, into five categories: (1) the board meeting 
passes the resolution in spite of the dissenting opinion;30 (2) the 
company publishes the dissenting opinion in compliance with 
material information disclosure laws; 31  (3) the board meeting 
accepts and follows the dissenting opinion; (4) no explanation; and 
 
 30 For purposes of calculation in this study, company disclosures on the MOPS stated 
as “ Handled per the board’s resolution and material information published in accordance 
with the law”, will be counted as a Category (1) response: “the board meeting passes the 
resolution in spite of the dissenting opinion.” 
 31 This category includes the simple disclosure of “material information published in 
accordance with the law” without any other explanations. 
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(5) others. The results from this empirical study are shown in Table 
4. 
 
Table 4: The Response to Dissenting Opinions Delivered by 
Independent Directors 
 
 TWSE-Listed TPEx-Listed ESB-Traded Total 
Pass the 
Resolution 
10/86 (11.6%) 10/62(16.1%) 2/13 (15.4%) 22/161 
(13.7%) 
Publish as 
Material 
Information 
46/86 (53.5%) 11/62 
(17.7%) 
0/13 (0%) 57/161 
(35.4%) 
Follow ID’s 
Opinions 
16/86 (18.6%) 11/62 
(17.7%) 
0/13 (0%) 27/161 
(16.8%) 
No 
Explanation 
13/86 (15.1%) 27/62 
(43.5%) 
11/13 
(84.6%) 
51/161 
(31.7%) 
Others 1/86 (1.2%)
32 3/62 (4.9%)33 0/13 (0%) 4/161 
(2.5%) 
 
As indicated in Table 4, 16.8% of the boards accepted and 
followed the dissenting opinions of their independent directors.  
This is not considered to be a high percentage. In addition, TWSE-
Listed companies indicated a slightly greater level of respect toward 
the dissenting opinions of their independent directors, accepting and 
following 18.6%.  As for ESB-Traded companies, there was not 
even a single case in which the board accepted and went along with 
a dissenting opinion issued by an independent director. 
Strictly speaking, except for category (3), where by the 
board accepts and follows a dissenting opinion delivered by 
independent directors, all other responses were the equivalent of 
 
 32 The disclosure of the company was “The company was in full accordance with the 
Company Act and the resolution of the 2014 first special shareholders meeting.” See infra 
Appendix p.34 (showing the dissenting opinion of (TWSE 2) on Mar. 24, 2017). 
 33 The responses of the three companies in this category were “[e]ntered into 
reporting items for shareholders meeting at the request of the independent director”, “[p]er 
attorney: changing the company seal is not a major issue” and “[p]er attorney: the special 
shareholders meeting convened by supervisor is against the law.” See infra Appendix 
pp.42-44 (showing dissenting opinions of (TPEX6) on Mar. 24, 2015, (TPEX 9) on Sept. 
18, 2016 and (TPEX 9) on Sept. 20, 2016, respectively). 
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disregard for the dissenting opinions through the passage of 
resolutions by the prevailing board members followed by disclosure 
of the requisite material information as a routine legal procedure.  
The remaining responses constituted 80.8% of the surveyed events 
and demonstrated the rarity of independent directors exerting any 
substantial influence on the decisions of their boards, much less 
effecting a change to the result. 
Note that disclosure laws require only that companies make 
known and publish on the MOPS only those opinions of 
independent directors that are in dissent; if, on the other hand, an 
independent director has a different opinion on certain agenda and 
his/her opinion is accepted at the close of the board meeting, there 
will be no disclosure or publication of such case.34  Therefore, data 
for such cases could not be found on the MOPS and were not 
available as a parameter for a more nuanced evaluation of 
independent director influence. 
It is worth noting that out of the 16 accept-and-follow 
responses for boards of TWSE-Listed companies, 14 were delivered 
by two or three independent directors in a collective action, and 
only 2 were delivered by a single director.35  This result infers that 
acts of solidarity by independent directors have a greater impact and 
higher chance for effecting change on board decisions.  In other 
words, the ability of independent directors to communicate and 
discuss their dissent amongst each other and reach consensus prior 
to a board meeting, as well as the opportunity to deliver their 
opinions together, has a direct impact on the level of respect 
companies confer upon their dissenting opinions and how seriously 
they treat them.  This has obvious bearing on the aim of enhancing 
corporate governance through the independent director mechanism 
and the ability to achieve it. 
Finally, 31.7% of the responses to dissenting opinions of 
independent directors disclosed on the MOPS were relegated to the 
category of “No Explanation.”  As discussed in the above Section 
III.B, such insufficient and incomplete disclosure undermines the 
ability to publicly evaluate the efficacy of the role played by 
independent directors. 
 
 34 See supra notes 13 & 21. 
 35 See infra Appendix pp. 32-33, 38, 40 (showing dissenting opinions of (TWSE12) 
on Jan. 13, 2017, (TWSE13) on Feb. 9, 2017, (TWSE13) on July 25, 2017, (TWSE20) Aug. 
9, 2017, and (TWSE23) Nov. 10, 2017, respectively). 
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D. Correlation between Independent Director Dissenting Opinions 
and Re-elections 
Professor Lucian A. Bebchuk and Professor Assaf Hamdani 
assert in their recent paper that: 
[t]he existing director-election regime significantly 
undermines the ability of independent directors to 
effectively perform their oversight role. Both the 
election and retention of independent directors 
normally depend on the controlling shareholders. As 
a result, these directors have incentives to go along 
with controllers’ wishes, or, at least, have inadequate 
incentives to protect public investors.36 
Taiwan’s situation is the same if not worse, since corporate 
ownership in Taiwan’s public companies is characterized by a 
tendency for the concentration of shares amongst a few holders and 
family-domination, as well as by the prevalence of business 
groups.37  A leading scholar in Taiwan observes that “[t]he virtue of 
an independent director is his/her independence from the control of 
management and/or major shareholders.  However, under existing 
Taiwanese laws, the election of independent directors is heavily 
dependent on the support of major shareholders/management. The 
independence of independent directors might be even less than that 
of supervisors.”38  Therefore, an independent director who makes 
inquiries, reservations, or votes against resolutions might be cast as 
a “trouble-maker” by the controlling shareholder/management of a 
company. 
This study explores an interesting and intriguing question: 
Whether an independent director who delivers dissenting opinions 
can garner support from controlling shareholders and still retain 
his/her seat on the board as an independent director for a subsequent 
term(s). 
 
 36 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Independent Directors and Controlling 
Shareholders, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1271, 1272 (2017). 
 37 Yin-Hua Yeh, Tsun-Siou Lee & Tracie Woidtke, Family Control and Corporate 
Governance: Evidence from Taiwan, 2 INT’L REV. of FINANCE, 21 (2001). See also CHANG, 
LIN & TSAI, supra note 1, at 259. 
 38 IN-JAW LAI (賴英照), THE NEWEST ANALYSIS OF SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE ACT 
(最新證券交易法解析：股市遊戲規則) 204 (2014). 
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This study finds 35, 35, and 13 independent directors on 
boards of TWSE-Listed, TPEx-Listed and ESB-Traded companies, 
respectively, delivered dissenting opinions during the 5-year period 
(2013-2017).  The websites of the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
(“MOEA”) 39 and MOPS were then checked to ascertain whether 
such independent directors were still registered as independent 
directors on the date of July 28, 2018.  This investigation reveal that 
out of the aforementioned independent directors, 23, 16, and 7, 
respectively, remained registered as an independent director per 
Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Independent Directors Delivering Dissenting Opinions 
Remain on the Boards 
 
 TWSE-
Listed  
TPEx-
Listed 
ESB-
Traded Total 
No. of IDs 
having 
delivered 
dissenting 
opinions 
remaining on 
boards/ Total 
No. of IDs 
Delivering 
Dissenting 
Opinions 
23/35 
(66%) 
16/35 
(46%) 
7/13 (54%) 46/83 
(55%) 
  
Table 5 shows that the average percentage of independent 
directors who delivered dissenting opinions and remained on aboard 
was 55% for the combined sum of TWSE/TPEx-Listed and ESB-
Traded companies.  This retention rate was highest for TWSE-
Listed companies at about 66%, but lowest for TPEx-Listed 
companies at about 46%.  Certain limitations, however, do require 
consideration as to their impact on this correlational study. 
First, reasons resulting in a change to the status quo include 
resignations, discharges, term limits, deaths, or new-elections.  A 
company is required to disclose a status change on the MOPS when 
an independent director resigns or relinquishes his/her seat before a 
 
 39 DEP’T OF COMMERCE BUS. REGISTRATION INQUIRY SERV. (經濟部商業司商工登記
公示資料查詢服務), http://findbiz.nat.gov.tw [https://perma.cc/UM8D-U5B3]. 
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term’s end.  This study aims to uncover the reasons for an 
independent director’s resignation or in-term relinquishment.  
Unsurprisingly, explanations given on the MOPS have a high 
degree of both similarity and ambiguity, such as “personal reasons”, 
“busy at work”, “personal career plan” or “health condition”. Such 
explanations offer very little information regarding the correlation 
between the relinquishment of an independent director’s seat and 
his/her delivery of dissenting opinions.  Second, discerning from the 
above-listed ambiguous reasons disclosed on the MOPS as to 
whether the relinquishment of a seat by an independent director was 
a passive or active act is a near impossibility.40  Third, this study 
investigated a five-year period but the terms for independent 
directors last three years, and companies are not required to give 
reasons why former independent directors were not re-nominated or 
re-elected at the end of their terms when disclosing newly elected 
independent directors on the MOPS.41  In addition, director terms 
are, of course, not synchronized amongst the various companies, so 
the election timing varies; thus, an independent director no longer 
registered on the website of MOEA as of July 28, 2018 might just 
be due to the expiry of his/her term.  Fourth, this study can neither 
exclude the possibility of other factors nor surmise their influence 
on the decisions of independent directors to stay or leave, such as 
remuneration standards, 42  exposure to liabilities, 43  enterprise 
 
 40 For example, the controlling shareholder or management hints to the independent 
director that it is no longer suitable for him/her to remain in office. 
 41 COMPANY ACT, supra note 12, at art. 195. (providing that “[t]he term of office of a 
director shall not exceed three years; but he/she may be eligible for re-election”). In 
practice, the term of office of a director, including an independent director, is three years in 
almost all companies. 
 42 A 2007 study indicates that remuneration for independent directors at a TWSE-
Listed company averaged about one million NTD per year; while at a TWSE-Listed 
company with an audit committee, the average remuneration of each independent director 
was about 400 million NTD per year. On the other hand, a TPEx-Listed company with 
independent directors averaged remuneration of about 0.3 million NTD per year for 
independent directors; while a TPEx-Listed company with an audit committee, the average 
remuneration of each independent director stayed around 0.3 million per year as well. Len-
Yu Liu (劉連煜), Xianxing Shangshi Shanggui Gongsi Duli Dongshi Zhidu Zhi Jiantao Ji 
Gaijin Fangan—Cong Shizheng Mian Chufa (現行上市上櫃公司獨立董事制度之檢討暨
改進方案—從實證面出發) [A Study of the Regime of Independent Directors of Listed 
Companies in Taiwan—Approach], 114 CHENG-CHI L. REV. (政大法學評論) 53, 117-118 
(2010). 
 43 Starting from 2014, the number of independent director resignations has been 
increasing every year in Taiwan. Fifty-five independent directors resigned in 2014; 71 
independent directors resigned in 2015; 93 independent directors resigned in 2016; 53 
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cultures, or working environments, etc.  Fifth, this study focused on 
independent directors who had delivered dissenting opinions that 
were recorded on the MOPS during the designated five-year period.  
To understand the correlation between the delivery of dissenting 
opinions and the re-election of independent directors more clearly, 
an empirical study of a comparative group, for example, the re-
election of those independent directors who never delivered 
dissenting opinions, should also be undertaken.  However, an 
empirical study of such large-scale was beyond the capacity of this 
study and, furthermore, would have entailed a degree of complexity 
beyond the scope of this preliminary investigation.  For example, 
this study traced 83 independent directors who delivered dissenting 
opinions during the five-year period to ascertain whether they had 
remained on their respective boards, which was within the handling 
capacity of this study.  However, those independent directors who 
have never delivered a dissenting opinion is of much greater 
magnitude.  For the single year of 2017, there were about 4223 
independent directors for all TWSE/TPEx-Listed companies, and 
only 48 had ever delivered a dissenting opinion.44  It means that this 
study would have had to track 4175 independent directors who had 
never delivered a dissenting opinion to check whether they had 
remained on their boards as independent directors.  Adding to the 
degree of difficulty was the fact that this study consisted of a five-
year survey; and, as such, resignations, discharges, deaths, re-
elections or term expiries for independent directors were made that 
much more difficult to clearly and accurately trace. 
Due to the aforementioned limitations, venturing to claim 
that there is a positive and direct correlation between the delivery of 
dissenting opinions by independent directors and their re-elections 
may overstate the case; nevertheless, the findings do shed light on 
the issue and point to the strong likelihood of a correlation.  The 45% 
 
independent directors resigned in the first half of 2017. In total, 272 independent directors 
have resigned over this three-and-a-half-year period. It is claimed that there is a crisis for 
corporate governance in Taiwan because independent directors choose to jump ship (leave 
the board). Yen-Wen Wang ( 王 妍 文 ), Dulidongshi Fenfen Qingci, 
3.5Nian272Tiaochuan—Nianxinqianwan, Daodi shi Zhuanhenda haishi Zuogongde (獨立
董事紛紛請辭，3.5 年 272 人跳船—年薪千萬，到底是賺很大還是做功德？) [The 
Resignation of Independent Directors: For Good or For Worse, 272 Persons Committed 
Suicides by Jumping out of Boats in 3.5 years?], GLOBAL VIEWS MONTHLY (遠見) (Dec. 26, 
2017), https://www.gvm.com.tw/article.html?id=41680 [https://perma.cc/G4VL-KUR3]. 
 44 See infra Appendix pp. 32-34, 44-47. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
22 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. [Vol. 15 
result shown for independent directors who delivered dissenting 
opinions as not being re-elected carries a certain amount of weight 
and merits further study. 
If an independent director considers the re-nomination and 
re-election of the next term a very important goal, he/she might 
consciously choose to avoid confrontation with the controlling 
shareholder or management by not delivering dissenting opinions 
when performing his/her fiduciary duties.  This would most 
certainly have a negative impact on the soundness of the 
independent director mechanism and its aim to improve corporate 
governance. 
IV. SOME IMPLICATIONS FROM THE RESULTS OF THIS 
EMPIRICAL STUDY 
Scholars have identified the lack of information as the core 
of gatekeeper failure to have an impact on corporate governance.45  
This has highlighted a fundamental paradox, namely, that 
Independence Actually Creates Dependency, since independent 
directors must then rely on company insiders to obtain 
information.46  This study, thus, illustrates how the cornerstone for 
an effective independent director mechanism is Sufficient 
Information or Access to Information: For example, no information 
equates to no monitoring. 47   With sufficient information, 
independent directors can have a solid foundation on which to base 
their support, modifications, reservations or objections to 
resolutions.  Without sufficient information, on the other hand, the 
only recourse that independent directors have when delivering 
dissenting opinions, including reservations and vetoes, is to rely on 
the protections afforded them under existing Taiwanese laws.  
 
 45 Merritt B. Fox, Gatekeeper Failure: Why Important, What to Do, 106 MICH. L. REV. 
1089, 1091 (2008); JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPER-THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 8 (2006). 
 46 J. N. Druey, Unabhaegigkeitals Gebot des allgemeinen Unternehmensrechts, in 
FESTSCHRIFT PETER DORALT 163, 169 (S. Kalss, C. Nowotny & M. Schauer (eds), Manz, 
2004) (citing INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN ASIA - A HISTORICAL, CONTEXTUAL AND 
COMPARATIVE APPROACH 27 (Dan W. Puchniak , Harald Baum & Luke Nottage eds., 
2017)). 
 47 Len-Yu Liu (劉連煜), I-Ching Tu (杜怡靜), Yu-Hsin Lin (林郁馨) & Christopher 
Chen Chao-Hung (陳肇鴻), XUANREN DULI DONGSHI YU GONGSI ZHILI (選任獨立董事與
公司治理) [ELECTION OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE] 16 
(2013). 
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Moreover, boards with a majority of independent directors are rare 
in Taiwan, so independent directors, being in the minority, need to 
act collectively if they want to have their opinions respected and 
accepted by the board.  To reach this goal, independent directors 
need to be able to communicate with each other and discuss 
information amongst themselves prior to board meetings.  The issue 
of sufficient information or access to information before a board 
meeting is crucial to effective coordination and cooperation 
amongst independent directors. 
On April 25, 2018, Paragraph 3, Article 14-2 was added to 
Taiwan’s SEA. It provides that: 
[t]he company may not impede, refuse, or evade the 
actions of the independent directors in the 
performance of their duties.  As the independent 
directors deem necessary to the performance of their 
duties, they may request the board of directors to 
appoint relevant personnel, or may at their own 
discretion hire professionals to provide assistance.  
The related expenses will be borne by the company. 
The legislative impetus behind this amendment was that: 
[a]lthough the laws require certain professional 
background of an independent director, it is hard to 
expect that an independent director will have the 
professions of accounting, law and corporate 
governance at the same time.  In addition, the past 
court decisions set a higher standard of conduct for 
independent directors to perform their duties, 
sometimes even higher than that of certified public 
accountants or lawyers, which is inconsistent and 
disproportionate with the powers of independent 
directors.  Therefore, if an independent director 
would like to responsibly perform his/her duties as 
well as make an independent and objective judgment, 
it is better to have professionals to provide him/her 
with assistance so that such an independent director 
can effectively monitor the operation of the company 
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and protect the rights and interests of shareholders . . . 
48 
This type of amendment has been widely praised as a 
corrective response with respect to the importance of sufficient 
information for independent directors.  It specifies that the company 
may not impede, refuse, or evade the actions of the independent 
directors in the performance of their duties and entitles an 
independent director with the right to obtain the assistance of 
professionals. 
Article 218 of the Company Act also sets forth that: 
[s]upervisors shall supervise the execution of 
business operations of the company, and may at any 
time or from time to time investigate the business 
and financial conditions of the company, inspect, 
transcribe or make copies of the accounting books 
and documents, and request the board of directors or 
managerial personnel to make reports thereon. 
This right to inspection and relevant information granted to 
supervisors is also applied mutatis mutandis to an independent 
director.49 
Based on the above laws, independent directors have, in 
theory, the right to sufficient information for the performance of 
their duties.  However, in practice, whether independent directors 
exercise such rights and the manner in which companies implement 
these laws still requires further observation. 
Ironically, the draft 2017 Amendment to the Company Act, 
submitted to the Legislative Yuan by the Executive Yuan, includes a 
newly-added Article 193-1 that specifically provides directors with 
both the right to information and protection against company 
impediments: “[f]or the purpose of performing their duties, directors 
may at any time or from time to time inspect, transcribe or make 
copies of the business and financial condition as well as accounting 
 
 48 Legislative Yuan, Yidong Tiaowen ji Liyou: Zhengquan Jiaoyi Fa (異動條文及理
由: 證券交易法) 
[Changed Clauses and Reasons: Securities Exchange Law], LIFA YUAN FALV XITONG (立
法院法律系統) [LEGISLATIVE YUAN LEGAL SYSTEM], https://lis.ly.gov.tw/lglawc/lglawkm 
[https://perma.cc/5HAW-GC47]. 
 49 SEC. EXCHANGE ACT, supra note 2, at art. 14-4. 4. 
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books and documents of the company, and the company may not 
evade, impede or refuse such action.”  The legislative purpose 
behind this proposed amendment can be inferred to be an intent to 
expand director rights: 
Article 8 and Article 23 of the Company Act set forth 
that a director is the responsible person of a limited-
by-share company, and he/she shall have the loyalty 
and shall exercise the due care of a good 
administrator in conducting the business operation of 
the company; and if he/she has acted contrary to this 
provision, shall be liable for the damages to be 
sustained by the company there from.  For 
performing their duties, directors shall have the right 
to inspect, transcribe and make copies of the Articles 
of Incorporation, accounting books and documents as 
provided in Article 210 and the company may not 
refuse such action.  Therefore, taking reference from 
the Article 218 regarding the scope of inspection 
right of supervisors, this amendment expands the 
scope of director’s inspection right.50 
Despite this implied necessity, the proposed amendment was 
deleted by the Legislative Yuan on July 6, 2018 out of concerns 
having to do with investors from China, conflicts over corporate 
control and protections of trade secrets. 51   Without rights to 
 
 50 Executive Yuan, Xingzheyuan Hui Tongguo “Gongsi Fa” Bufen Tiaowen Xiuzheng 
Caoan (行政院會通過「公司法」部分條文修正草案) [Executive Yuan Conference 
Passed Draft Amendments on Part of the Clauses of “Company Act”], 
https://www.ey.gov.tw/Page/9277F759E41CCD91/7d24c7d1-11ec-4edb-88d5-
e7512506814e [https://perma.cc/W5MF-XXPC] (Dec. 21, 2017). Shareholders have the 
right to inspect, transcribe and make copies of the Articles of Incorporation, the minutes of 
every shareholders’ meeting, financial statements, the shareholders roster and the 
counterfoil of corporate bonds issued by the company as provided in Article 210. Also, 
supervisors have the right to inspect, transcribe or make copies of the accounting books 
and documents, and request the board of directors or managerial personnel to make reports 
thereon as provided in Article 218. However, there is no article explicitly empowering 
directors the right of inspection in the Company Act. In addition, the court decisions are 
split regarding whether directors have the same inspection rights as supervisors. Therefore, 
this proposed amendment is inferred to be an intent to expand director’s inspection right. 
 51 The main reason for such deletion is the concern that investors from China can 
easily copy the trade secrets of Taiwanese companies as long as they manage to get elected 
to the board. In addition, if there is a fight for corporate control between an incumbent 
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inspection and proper access to information, the ability of directors 
to perform their fiduciary duties and efforts to improve the quality 
of corporate governance are severely hampered, in particular, 
companies might recklessly refuse requests by directors to inspect 
their records.52  Such a deletion with direct implications on director 
rights to inspection should be subject to further review and 
deliberation. 
Other measures to improve the rights to information for 
independent directors, in addition to those reviewed above, should 
also be considered.  First, a mechanism to facilitate independent 
director meetings with internal auditors and certified public 
accountants, without management present, should be actively 
pursued and established.53  Paragraph 4, Article 7 of the Regulations 
Governing the Exercise of Powers by Audit Committees of Public 
Companies provides that: 
The audit committee may by resolution request 
relevant department officers, internal auditors, 
certified public accountants, legal counsels, or other 
personnel to attend the meeting as nonvoting 
participants and provide pertinent and necessary 
information; provided, they shall leave the meeting 
when discussion and voting take place.54 
 
group and an acquiring group, and if the acquiring group has a seat on the board, it can use 
this right of inspection granted to directors to inspect trade secrets and other documents of 
the target company. See Wan-Hsin Peng (彭琬馨), Chaoye Jiaofeng, Puxuan Chayue 
Quan Wei Guo (朝野交鋒，普董查閱權未過) [Debate in Legislative Yuan, Deletion of 
Director’s Inspection Right], LIBERTY TIMES NET ( 自 由 時 報 ) (July 7, 2018), 
http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/1214753 [https://perma.cc/W8FX-848V]. 
 52 Wallace Wen-Yu Wang (王文宇), Gongsi Fa Ren You Gaijin Kongjian (公司法仍
有改進空間) [There Are Some Rooms for Improvement of the Company Act], JINGJI RIBAO 
( 經 濟 日 報 ) [ECONOMIC DAILY NEWS] (July 10, 2018), 
https://money.udn.com/money/story/5629/3243724 [https:// perma.cc/8KNN-KMTE]. 
 53 Qianghua Duli Dongshi Zhineng Luoshi Gongsi Zhili, (強化獨立董事職能 落實公
司治理 ) [Strengthening the Function of Independent Directors and Implementing the 
Corporate Governance], CHINATIMES.COM (中時電子報 ) (Oct. 28, 2016, 04:11 AM), 
http://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20161028000095-260210 [https://perma.cc/X2L2-
RBDJ]. 
 54 AUDIT COMMITTEE REGULATIONS, supra note 17, at art. 7. (showing that the 
amendment adopted on July 28, 2017 was to strengthen the corporate governance and 
avoid the presence of non-voting participants as an influencing factor on the discussions 
and votes of the audit committee). 
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Also, Paragraph 2, Article 3 of the Corporate Governance 
Best Practice Principles for TWSE/TPEx Listed Companies 
provides that: 
TWSE/TPEx Listed companies are advised to 
establish channels and mechanisms of 
communication between their independent directors, 
audit committees or supervisors, and chief internal 
auditors, and the convener of the audit committee or 
supervisors shall report their communication with the 
independent directors and chief internal auditors at 
the shareholders’ meeting.55 
This type of best practice has also become one of the 
indicators for the Corporate Governance Evaluation System of the 
TWSE.56 
Second, the corporate secretary mechanism should be 
instituted since the corporate secretary has the duty to provide all 
directors with the full information regarding the business of the 
company.57  In the draft of the 2017 Amendment to Company Act 
submitted to the Legislative Yuan by the Executive Yuan, the 
proposed Article 215-1 sets forth that “[t]he company may establish 
a corporate governance professional to assist directors and 
supervisors to perform the duty of loyalty and the due care of a good 
administrator in conducting the business operation of the 
company.” 58   This corporate governance professional has a role 
highly similar to that of a corporate secretary.  However, this 
 
 55 Shangshi Shanggui Gongsi Zhili Shiwu Shouze (上市上櫃公司治理實務守則) 
[Corporate Governance Best Practice Principles for TWSE/TPEx Listed Companies] 
(promulgated by TWSE, Dec. 12, 2018, effective Dec. 12, 2018), 
http://eng.selaw.com.tw/LawArticle.aspx?LawID=FL020553&ModifyDate=1071212 
[https://perma.cc/Z5PW-C9BE]. 
 56 TAIWAN STOCK EXCHANGE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CENTER, THE 2019 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE EVALUATION INDICATOR 2.15 (Jan. 2019), 
http://cgc.twse.com.tw/evaluationCorp/listEn [perma.cc/7TEX-7MCK]. 
 57 Wan-Ru Tseng(曾宛如) & Christopher Chen Chao-Hung (陳肇鴻), Jianli Gongsi 
Mishu Zhidu zhi Chuyi (建立公司秘書制度之芻議) [The Proposal to Establish the 
Corporate Secretary Mechanism], 226 TAIWAN L. REV. (月旦法學雜誌) 106, 118 (2014). 
 58 Executive Yuan, Xingzheyuan Hui Tongguo “Gongsi Fa” Bufen Tiaowen Xiuzheng 
Caoan (行政院會通過「公司法」部分條文修正草案) [Executive Yuan Conference 
Passed Draft Amendments on Part of the Clauses of “Company Act”], 
https://www.ey.gov.tw/Page/9277F759E41CCD91/7d24c7d1-11ec-4edb-88d5-
e7512506814e [https://perma.cc/W5MF-XXPC] (Dec. 21, 2017). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
28 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. [Vol. 15 
proposal was deleted by the Legislative Yuan in the final version of 
the 2018 Company Act. 
The FSC realizes the importance of the corporate secretary 
mechanism for promoting corporate governance and has adopted the 
corporate governance professional mechanism in its Corporate 
Governance Roadmap (2018-2020).  The FSC will implement such 
mechanism in two phases: starting from 2019 (Phase I), companies 
in the financial industry and TWSE/TPEx-Listed non-financial 
companies with paid-in capital of NTD 10 billion or more should 
establish at least one such professional; and, starting from 2021 
(Phase II), TWSE/TPEx Listed non-financial companies with paid-
in capital not less than NTD 2 billion but less than TWD 10 billion 
should establish at least one such professional.59 
Third, independent directors should have greater power with 
respect to internal and external auditing. Audit committees shall 
have the direct and final decisions on the appointment, discharge, 
performance evaluation and remuneration of the chief internal 
auditor and certified public accountant, and as such, internal and 
external auditors should not be subject to simply obeying the CEO 
or general manager.60  Under the existing Article 14-5 of the SEA in 
Taiwan, “the hiring or dismissal of an attesting CPA, or the 
compensation given thereto” and “the appointment or discharge of a 
financial, accounting, or internal auditing officer” are within the 
authority of the audit committee.61 
A notable example of reducing the “information gap” that 
exists between management and the board is that of Netflix, which 
is implemented as a novel board practice.  The Netflix approach has 
incorporated two highly unique practices: (1) Board members 
periodically attend (in an observing capacity only) monthly and 
quarterly senior management meetings, and (2) board 
communications are structured as approximately 30-page online 
 
 59 FIN. SUPERVISORY COMMISSION, R.O.C (TAIWAN) SECURITIES AND FUTURES 
BUREAU, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ROADMAP (2018-2020) (May 10, 2018), 
https://www.sfb.gov.tw/en/home.jsp?id=106&parentpath=0,8,105 
[https://perma.cc/W6U7-SEG5]. 
 60 Chang-Hsien Tsai (蔡昌憲), Xingsi Gongsi Zhili Xia Zhi Neibu Jiandu Jizhi—Yi 
Duli Zixun Guandao de Qianghua wei Hexin (省思公司治理下之內部監督機制——以獨
立資訊管道的強化為核心) [Rethinking Internal Monitoring Mechanisms of Corporate 
Governance: An Approach to Strengthening Independent Information Channels], 141 
CHENGCHI L. REV. (政大法學評論) 197, 258-259 (2015). 
 61 SEC. EXCHANGE ACT, supra note 2, at art. 14-5. 
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memos in narrative form that not only include links to supporting 
analyses but also allow open access to all data and information on 
the company’s internal shared systems, including the ability to ask 
clarifying questions from the subject authors.  This quarterly memo 
is written by and shared with the top 90 executives as well as the 
board.62  Such practice might be a worthwhile reference for some 
Taiwanese companies. 
Finally, from the perspective of disclosure, in the process of 
collecting information, this study has found that some of the 
required items or explanations in public disclosures of dissenting 
opinions delivered by independent directors are either left blank or 
filled-in with incomplete or ambiguous descriptions: Specifically, 
the disclosure items for “the reason for dissenting opinions,” “the 
response to the dissenting opinions” and “the reason for leaving the 
office as an independent director” are yet to be completed.  The 
competent authority, FSC, should strengthen their enforcement on 
the implementation of disclosure.  Otherwise, such insufficient 
disclosures will fail to provide investors and markets with complete 
information for bettering understanding as per one of the functions 
of independent directors, as well as hinder evaluations concerning a 
company’s corporate governance. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Several important results from this empirical study 
contribute to the field of corporate governance.  First, the number of 
incidents for the delivery of dissenting opinions by independent 
directors has been shown to increase sharply in recent years for 
companies in all three areas (TWSE, TPEx, and ESB).  Nonetheless, 
the number of independent directors delivering dissenting opinions 
remains comparatively small as indicated, for example, by the 1.1% 
ratio (48 dissensions out of a total of 4223 independent directors) 
for 2017. 63   In general, the percentage of independent directors 
delivering dissenting opinions in Taiwan, as indicated by this study, 
is quite low. 
 
 62 David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan, Netflix Approach to Governance: Genuine 
Transparency with the Board (May 10, 2018), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/05/10/netflix-approach-to-governance-genuine-
transparency-with-the-board [https://perma.cc/R2B3-QYW6]. 
 63 See supra note 28. 
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Second, the reasons given for dissenting opinions by 
independent directors are rather diverse.  Nevertheless, this study 
finds the reason of insufficient information, and those of a similar 
nature, to be relatively common.  This result indicates that for the 
independent director mechanism to function more effectively, the 
issue of information asymmetry with respect to independent 
directors is urgent in Taiwan. 
Third, from the perspective of whether dissenting opinions 
delivered by independent directors actually impact or change board 
decisions, this study has revealed that only 16.8% of the dissenting 
opinions delivered by independent directors, during the 5-year 
period reviewed, has been accepted and followed by the board.  
TWSE-Listed companies showed the highest percentage of 
acceptance for dissenting opinions, which is 18.6%.  In addition, 
this study points to collective action as a positive factor in the 
delivery of dissenting opinions by independent directors, since the 
probability of board-meeting acceptance and adherence increased in 
such cases. 
Fourth, the average percentage of independent directors 
remaining in office as independent directors after delivering 
dissenting opinions was 55% as of July 28, 2018.  Due to some 
limitations to this research, a positive and direct correlation between 
an independent director’s dissenting opinion and his/her re-election 
could not be definitively reached.  Nevertheless, this result sheds 
light on the possibility of a very pertinent correlation in Taiwan. 
Furthermore, this study strongly implies the foundational 
importance of sufficient information as a cornerstone to the 
performance of the independent director role and discusses some 
measures to improve its function in Taiwan. 
Finally, to more fully evaluate the effectiveness of the 
independent director mechanism in Taiwan, more complete and 
clear disclosure on the MOPS should be enforced. 
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[APPENDIX] CHART OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR 
DISSENTING OPINIONS (2013-2017) 
Explanation: 
1. Independent director dissenting opinions assessed in this 
study covered the time period from 1/1/2013 to 12/31/2017. 
2. Collection of data on the circumstances for a director’s 
vacancy of his/her seat was discontinued after 7/28/2018.  In 
determining whether an independent director was still 
registered as such as of 7/28/2018, this study relied upon 
data publicly available on the website of the Department of 
Commerce of Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs as 
well as information disclosed on the Market Observation 
Post System (MOPS) of the Taiwan Stock Exchange 
Corporation.  An asterisk (*) by a director’s name indicates a 
director’s continued status as an independent director, 
whereas the absence of an asterisk without any other 
explanation is indicative of a departure.  Additionally, for 
the purposes of this study, members of remuneration 
committees who did not originally have independent director 
status, regardless of whether or not they were later elected as 
independent directors, were still considered in the tally of 
independent directors who stayed or left as of 7/28/2018. 
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TWSE-listed Companies 
 
Year Company Date Subject Incident & Causes Reason 
Company 
Response and 
Action(s) Taken 
2013 (TWSE 1) 10 
APR 
2013 
(TWSE ID1)64 
(Remuneration 
committee) 
 
Review of compensation 
and methods of 
assessment for supervisors 
& managers. 
 [Veto] 
TWSE ID1 expressed that the proposed 
amendment of Article 7.11.3.1 (Group 
chairman, general manager, dual-serving 
executive director & deputy GM, . . .) was 
unnecessary, and should retain the original 
wording of the Article (Group chairman, 
GM and deputy GM, . . .). 
Revised article 
passed with 
majority vote in 
favor. 
(TWSE 2) 01  
JUL 
2013 
(TWSE ID2)* Item on “the company’s 
merger with company A; 
the company to be 
maintained, whereas 
company A to be 
dissolved” being brought 
before the meeting of 
managing directors for 
review. 
[Veto] 
Not within the scope of authority for a 
managing directors’ meeting. 
 
 
(TWSE 2) 05  
JUL 
2013 
(TWSE ID2) Item on “the members and 
authority of the company’s 
merger investigatory task 
force,” being brought 
before the meeting of 
managing directors for 
review.  
[Veto] 
Not within the scope of authority for a 
managing directors’ meeting.  
 
 
(TWSE 3) 26  
JUL 
2013 
(TWSE ID3)* 
 
Revision to the company’s 
operational plan. 
[Reservation] 
The administrative act of the National 
Communications Commission (NCC), 
requiring that the company’s news channels 
should be changed into non-news channels 
in the completed operation plan, is not 
entirely fair.  The company, as a publicly 
traded entity, should be dealt with from a 
position of neutrality by the NCC, which 
should avoid influencing the operational 
policies and corporate governance of 
publicly traded companies.  The company’s 
 
 
      64  Subject TWSE 1 was not yet an independent director when this opinion was 
delivered (the company did not yet have an independent director as of the date in 2013 
when TWSE 1 viewed the revised by-laws). 
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passive cooperation with this demand of the 
administrative act of the NCC would create 
an inequity for the company’s shareholders. 
(TWSE 2) 05 
AUG 
2013 
(TWSE ID2) 
(TWSE ID4) 
Proposal to the board of 
directors to pass 
resolutions on regular 
board meeting reported 
matters, discussion items, 
matters of routine 
reporting, deliberations on 
the sale of bad debt, 
deliberations on granting 
credit, and other such 
issues. 
[Veto] 
(1) (TWSE ID2): reiterated opposition 
on the two matters concerning the merger, 
“the case of the company’s merger with 
company A” and “the establishment of an 
investigative committee on the company’s 
merger with company A,” with a request 
that these dissenting opinions be entered 
into the board minutes. 
(2) (TESE ID4): opposition to the two 
matters concerning the merger, “the case of 
the company’s merger with company A” 
and “the establishment of an investigative 
committee on the company’s merger with 
company A.” 
 
2015 (TWSE 4) 06 
JAN 
2015 
(TWSE ID5) 
 
Consideration of 
equipment replacement; 
and, operational and 
cooperative business 
relationships in the 
purchase of machinery 
and equipment.  
[Veto] 
Concerns about financial liabilities and 
impacts to company interests. 
 
(TWSE 5) 23 
APR 
2015 
(TWSE ID6)* Rectification of all 
resolutions and matters 
from 2012 shareholders 
meetings; and, 
rectification of one board 
member and supervisor 
selected in the 7th term by-
election as well as such 
matters as their behavior 
over an entire term. 
[Veto]  
(TWSE 2) 04 
MAY 
2015 
(TWSE ID7)* 
 
Distributions of surplus 
earnings for FY2013 and 
said distribution in the 
form of new shares. 
[Veto] 
Suggest to raise the ratio for cash dividend 
distributions. 
 
(TWSE 6) 12 
AUG 
2015 
(TWSE ID8) On planned application to 
Bank B for a continuation 
of the short-term credit 
limit and period. 
[Veto] 
(1) Agree to delete Paragraph 1, (regarding 
company’s operational plan) and Paragraph 
2 (regarding yearly financial statement) of 
Article 3 in the “Rule concerning the 
Responsibilities and Regulations of 
Independent Directors”, but other matters, 
which, in accordance with relevant 
Material 
information 
published in 
accordance with 
the Law. On planned application to 
Bank C for a continuation 
of short-term credit limit 
and period. 
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On planned application to 
Bank D for a continuation 
of short-term credit limit 
and period. 
ordinances and the rules of the Articles of 
Incorporation, are resolved by a 
shareholders meeting or a board of directors 
meeting or by the competent authority in the 
case of material items, should still be 
recorded and stated clearly in the meeting 
minutes of the board, if independent 
directors have dissenting opinions.   
(2) Suggest that there be a board resolution 
on consultant remuneration. 
(3) In consideration of the monitoring duties 
of the board, it would be inappropriate for 
the company to nominate a director of an 
unprofitable subsidiary to return as a 
consultant to the subsidiary. 
On plan to appoint 
remuneration committee 
for the third term. 
On plan to stipulate the 
responsibilities and 
regulations for 
independent directors.  
On plan to stipulate the 
exercise of authority and 
method of remuneration 
for board-hired 
consultants. 
(TWSE 6) 10 
NOV 
2015 
(TWSE ID8) On planned application to 
Bank E for a continuation 
of short-term credit limit 
and period. 
[Veto] Material 
information 
published in 
accordance with 
the Law. Proposal of FY105 Audit 
Plan. 
On the issue of the 
proposal by Company F 
(commissioned by the 
company) to retain 
Company G to carry out 
the integration of urban 
renewal projects. 
2016 (TWSE 2) 18 
MAR 
2016 
(TWSE ID7) On the revision of some 
articles in the company’s 
Articles of Incorporation 
needed in order to align 
the company’s business 
developments with 
relevant laws and 
regulations. 
[Veto] 
Opposed to the raising of the company’s 
authorized capital from NTD90 billion to 
NTD110 billion.  Based on the company’s 
capital adequacy indicators, the company 
has sufficient capital for FY2016 to meet 
the standard, therefore, for the present there 
is no clear urgency to carry out the revision. 
 
(TWSE 7) 21 
APR 
2016 
(TWSE ID9) Nomination of 
independent director 
candidates for the eighth 
board term. 
 
[Veto] 
(1) One would expect that independent 
director candidates nominated by a large 
shareholder are qualified based on 
international corporate governance 
standards; there remains some doubt with 
regards to the list of nominees presented 
here by the board and their fields of 
specialization. 
(2) It was proposed that the board hire an 
Material 
information 
published in 
accordance with 
the Law. 
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unbiased outsider to take on the task of 
setting up, in an organized manner, an 
investigatory committee.  Upon completion 
of the report looking into the issues raised, 
the matter should be brought before the 
board again for discussion and resolution. 
(3) Recommended that the company should 
immediately revise the Articles of 
Incorporation and a nomination committee 
be set up under the board of directors, so as 
to improve corporate governance. 
(TWSE 6) 02 
JUN 
2016 
(TWSE ID8) On the drafting of the 
Management’s Report on 
Internal Controls for 
FY2015.  
[Veto] Material 
information 
published in 
accordance with 
the Law. On the consolidated 
financial statements and 
individual financial 
statements for FY2015. 
Complete data was not included in the 
notice to convene; relevant data for the 
impairment of assets item not yet provided.  
On the issue of making-up 
for surpluses and losses  
[Veto] 
On the issue of the 2015 
Annual Business Report. 
Complete data was not included in the 
notice to convene 
Rectifying a supervisor to 
represent the company in 
the criminal case against A 
for damages to reputation.    
Board member A’s statement should fall 
within the scope of freedom of speech. 
On revisions to some 
articles of the Articles of 
Incorporation.  
[Veto] 
On the drafting of the 
plans for the 2016 
shareholder meeting 
concerning time, location 
and relevant agenda and 
reporting items.  
[Veto] 
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(TWSE 8) 08 
AUG 
2016 
(TWSE ID10) 
 
On the issue of overseas 
subsidiary H plans to 
purchase from a related 
person the 24.98% stake 
in company I and 
indirectly hold 100% 
shareholding of the 
Mainland China 
investment firm, J 
company. 
[Reservation] 
Insufficient information to determine a 
reasonable price for the transaction.  
Material 
information 
published in 
accordance with 
the Law. 
(TWSE 6) 24 
OCT 
2016 
(TWSE ID8) Revision of some parts of 
the Articles of 
Incorporation. 
Revision to the Articles of Incorporation is 
not required under Taiwan corporate law 
since the issuance of employee stock 
warrants is within the authorized capital 
limits.  
Material 
information 
published in 
accordance with 
the Law. 
On revision to part of the 
“Methods for the Election 
of Directors and 
Supervisors.” 
Error in the wording of the revision. 
Plans for convening a 
special shareholders 
meeting for a full re-
election of the company 
directors and supervisors. 
 
Insufficient Information. 
On plan to cancel the non-
competition limitations for 
directors and their 
representatives  
[Veto] 
On drafting the time, 
location, relevant reports, 
and independent director 
nominations for the first 
special shareholders 
meeting of 2016.  
[Veto] 
(TWSE 6) 24 
OCT 
2016 
(TWSE ID11) Plans for convening a 
special shareholders 
meeting for a full re-
election of the company’s 
directors and supervisors. 
[Veto] Material 
information 
published in 
accordance with 
the Law. 
(TWSE 9) 10 
NOV 
2016 
(TWSE ID12) On the matter of a loan to 
reinvest in company K for 
company K’s factory 
construction capital of 
[Veto] Material 
information 
published in 
accordance with 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol15/iss1/17
2019] U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 37 
NTD250 million.  the Law. 
(TWSE 6) 11 
NOV 
2016 
(TWSE ID8) FY2017 audit plan. Audit plan still needs adjusting. Material 
information 
published in 
accordance with 
the Law. 
Deliberations on standards 
for the provision of 
manager annual bonuses.  
Attachment on allocation standards lacking. 
(TWSE 
10) 
23 
DEC 
2016 
(TWSE 
ID13)* 
(TWSE 
ID14)* 
(TWSE 
ID15)* 
On the matter of 
subscription for a capital 
increase in the form of 
cash for subsidiary L. 
 
The general manager continues to discuss 
and investigate with counterparts in the 
joint venture about methods to improve 
operations. 
To be handled by 
board resolution. 
2017 (TWSE 
11) 
13 
JAN 
2017 
(TWSE ID16) 
 
On the matter of the stop-
loss point for the Suzhou 
investment or financing; 
and, motion to loan 
company N RMB2.95 
million from subsidiary 
M’s newly increased 
capital.  
[Reservation]  
(TWSE 
12) 
13 
JAN 
2017 
(TWSE 
ID17)* 
(TWSE 
ID18)* 
On the matter of re-
investment to set-up 
“Company O”. 
[Reservation] 
This matter passed after board discussion. 
However, the research submitted to the 
board is not complete in terms of data on 
the competitive market for the investment 
and situational analyses, such as levels of 
sensitivity, along with minutes from internal 
assessment meetings and other relevant 
material.  
Management, in 
accordance with 
board’s opinion, 
to provide 
supplementary 
information for 
board’s 
deliberation.  
(TWSE 2) 24 
JAN 
2017 
(TWSE ID7) Proposal for board 
deliberations about 
agreement to terminate the 
shareholder service agent 
agreement of company P, 
and the switch to company 
Q as agent for shareholder 
services. 
[Veto] 
The resolution process in this matter 
violated rules on the avoidance of conflicts 
of interest, and the resultant resolution 
violated relevant laws and corporate 
governance. The directors taking part in the 
resolution should bear joint and several 
liabilities in accordance with Article 193 of 
the Company Act.  
 
(TWSE 
13) 
09 
FEB 
2017 
(TWSE 
ID19)* 
On the matter of handling-
fee payments for financial 
guarantees made to 
guarantors. 
 
[Reservation] 
Suggest to draft up relevant rules and 
present at shareholders meeting for 
approval. 
 
 
A relevant rule 
will be drafted 
based on the 
independent 
director’s opinion 
and will be 
presented at the 
shareholders 
meeting after 
board approval.  
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(TWSE 
14) 
09 
MAR 
2017
  
(TWSE 
ID20)* 
 
On revisions to Laos 
investment. 
 
(1) Suggest to hire a corporate attorney and 
CPA to provide professional opinion 
following on-site investigation; and, the 
investment sum should be remitted to an 
escrow account as opposed to direct 
remittance to Party B’s account. 
(2) Financial controls should be 
strengthened in the joint venture and a 
management mechanism to protect funds 
should be considered.  
Material 
information 
published in 
accordance with 
the Law. 
(TWSE 
15) 
15 
MAR 
2017 
(TWSE 
ID21)* 
 
On the distribution of 
capital reserve in the form 
of cash. 
 
[Veto] Handled per the 
board’s resolution 
and material 
information 
published in 
accordance with 
the Law. 
(TWSE 2) 24 
MAR 
2017 
(TWSE ID7) On the election of 
directors for the 25th term 
(including independent 
directors). 
[Veto] 
Director terms should be in full accordance 
with the Company Act and the resolution of 
the 2014 first special shareholders meeting. 
The company 
was in full 
accordance with 
the Company Act 
and the resolution 
of the 2014 first 
special 
shareholders 
meeting. 
(TWSE 9) 13 
APR 
2017 
(TWSE ID12) On capital reduction in the 
form of cash. 
[Veto] 
Objection with respect to most participating 
directors and supervisors having only 
received notice of the meeting one day 
before in the afternoon; and, the resolution 
on capital reduction having been rushed 
through without directors being given the 
opportunity to more fully discuss the matter 
after having been able to look into its 
advantages and disadvantages or gains and 
losses.    
Material 
information 
published in 
accordance with 
the Law. 
(TWSE 5) 25 
APR 
2017 
(TWSE ID6) 
 
On the revision of some 
parts of the Articles of 
Incorporation. 
 [Veto] 
Audit Committee: 
This proposal should be first sent to the 
internal management committee; the 
proposal is not sufficiently exhaustive; 
dividend payments for preferred shares are 
still too high; obvious infringements on the 
rights of the company and individual 
shareholders. Recommend this case be sent 
back to the management committee for 
reconsideration.    
(1) After 
thorough 
discussion, the 
proposal passed 
the audit 
committee at a 
ratio of 2:1 (all 
three members 
of the 
committee 
present, 2 ayes 
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Board: 
This case has not yet been first presented to 
the internal management committee; there 
are conflicts of interest to be avoided and 
the original financial situation and 
conditions since the issuance of preferred 
shares has changed. The aforementioned 
proposal is not equitable to individual 
shareholders; an opinion of dissent has been 
expressed against this case. 
and 1 nay). The 
final resolution 
was completely 
different from 
the opinion 
expressed by 
the independent 
director (TWSE 
ID6). 
(2) After 
thorough 
discussion, the 
proposal passed 
the board at a 
ratio of 6:5 (all 
eleven board 
members were 
present, 6 ayes 
and 5 nays). 
The final 
resolution was 
completely 
different from 
the opinion 
expressed by 
the independent 
director (TWSE 
ID6). 
(TWSE 
16) 
27 
APR 
2017 
(TWSE ID22) March 2017 audit report 
by Audit Office. 
 
[Reservation] 
Please reference the written issues of 27 
APR 2017 raised by supervisor B, 
especially that concerning a more detailed 
audit of the subsidiary(s).  
 
 
(TWSE 
17) 
12 
MAY 
2017
  
(TWSE 
ID23)* 
On the matter of Company 
chairman C being a 
consultant to the 
subsidiary. 
[Reservation] Material 
information 
published in 
accordance with 
the Law. 
(TWSE 
16) 
23 
MAY 
2017 
(TWSE ID22) April 2017 audit report by 
Audit Office. 
[Reservation] 
According to this specialized report, suggest 
a review of the details regarding the 
accounts receivable and build-up of 
inventory in the subsidiary. 
 
(TWSE 9) 08 
JUN 
2017 
(TWSE ID12) On the re-appointment of 
directors & supervisors in 
Subsidiary R. 
[Veto] 
More than 75% of the company’s assets are 
accounted for by company R, therefore the 
seating of directors and supervisors for both 
Material 
information 
published in 
accordance with 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
40 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. [Vol. 15 
companies should correspond; object to re-
appointment. 
the Law. 
Subsidiary R should 
combine the land of the 
adjacent company and 
jointly develop it. 
 
 
[Veto] 
There is no reason to prohibit a parent 
company to supervise or manage the matter 
of handling the development of assets of the 
100% owned subsidiary; request for the 
subsidiary to provide all relevant 
information, such as comparison of pros and 
cons to the board for understanding and 
discussion. If the board were, today, to 
make a resolution that the board cannot 
supervise or manage such matter, I cannot 
agree.   
(TWSE 5) 15 
JUN 
2017 
(TWSE ID6) Plan to keep the scheduled 
agenda for the 16 JUN 
2017 shareholders 
meeting and the special 
preferred shareholders 
meeting. 
[Veto] 
Recommended to cancel the proposal to 
revise the Articles of Incorporation through 
a shareholders proposal in the shareholders 
meetings, and suggest a more appropriate 
solution that meets with the approval of 
authorities; and, also propose that during the 
vote to pay attention to the avoidance of 
conflicts of interest. 
After thorough 
discussion, the 
resolution passed 
on a 6:5 vote (all 
11 members of 
the board were 
present with 6 
ayes and 5 nays). 
The final 
resolution was 
completely 
different from the 
opinion 
expressed by the 
independent 
director (TWSE 
ID6). 
(TWSE 
14) 
19 
JUN 
2017 
(TWSE ID20) On continued investment 
Laos. 
 
(1) Disparity exists between the company’s 
business and this investment in land and 
property. 
(2) Investment in the assets of company T 
has not yet gone through the process of 
evaluation. 
(3) No feasibility analysis for this 
investment project; opportunities and risks 
are not clear. 
Material 
information 
published in 
accordance with 
the Law. 
(TWSE 9) 30 
JUN 
2017 
(TWSE ID12) Extemporary motion from 
the 22nd term’s first board 
meeting is null and void; 
convening of special 
board meeting on the 
matter of replacing 
company R’s directors & 
supervisors.  
[Veto] 
Company R is a 100% wholly-owned 
subsidiary of the company and set up 
essentially as a proxy for holding the parent 
company’s land assets. In substance it is 
more than a mere specialized real estate 
development company with its main 
business activities having to do with the 
Material 
information 
published in 
accordance with 
the Law. 
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management and employment of profits 
from its land assets. Company R is, in fact, 
an important part of the company’s division 
for asset management; and, as such, in 
compliance with the principles of corporate 
governance, it should be under the 
supervision and direction of the company 
and should not escape the board of 
directors’ scope of authority. Having the 
same members of directors and supervisors 
in both parent company and its subsidiary 
was consistent with the principles of 
corporate governance, but from the point of 
view of replacements, the legality and 
legitimacy is, in fact, difficult to make out; 
so, I cannot agree with such replacement.  
(TWSE 
18) 
14 
JUL 
2017 
(TWSE 
ID24)* 
(TWSE 
ID25)* 
 
Discussions about 
company T shareholder 
advances in subsidiary 
company S receivables. 
 
[Veto] 
(1) Relevant Personnel should avoid 
conflicts of interest so as to avoid giving 
rise to losses due to inappropriate acts. 
(2) This case has been going on for as long 
as ten years, and relevant data is probably 
incomplete. Recommend that the company 
immediately secure the materials and 
appoint a specialist to handle the matter. 
(3) Recommend for the company to proceed 
per board resolution and immediately 
appoint an attorney and send the relevant 
materials to an investigative body, so as to 
protect the interests of shareholders. 
Handled per the 
board’s resolution 
and material 
information 
published in 
accordance with 
the Law. 
(TWSE 
13) 
25  
JUL 
2017 
(TWSE 
ID26)65 
(Remuneration 
Committee) 
 
Deliberations on 2016 
compensation allocations 
for directors and 
supervisors. 
[Reservation] 
Significant difference between proposed 
director & supervisor compensation and that 
of the previous year; recommend 
assessment and adjustment. 
Material 
information 
published in 
accordance with 
the Law; date 
chosen for the 
convening of the 
remuneration 
committee. 
(TWSE 
19) 
07 
AUG 
2017 
(TWSE 
ID27)* 
2016 Q2 consolidated 
financial statements.  
[Reservation] 
Expressed reservations about some of the 
item explanations in the financial 
statements, the relevant departments should 
attach supplementary explanations 
following the meeting.  
Material 
information 
published in 
accordance with 
the Law. 
 
      65 Not an independent director of (TWSE 13) at the time the opinion was posted. 
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(TWSE 
20) 
09 
AUG 
2017 
(TWSE 
ID28)* 
(TWSE 
ID29)* 
(TWSE 
ID30)* 
On the matter of company 
U’s NT$220 million loan. 
[Veto] 
Audit Committee: (TWSE ID28) opposed. 
Board: (TWSE ID28) opposed. 
[Reservation] 
Audit Committee and the Board: (TWSE 
ID29), (TWSE ID30) expressed that they 
could agree to the loan only after the 
borrower, i.e. Company U, had agreed to 
supplemental conditions. 
Request the 
borrower to 
submit all 
relevant materials 
and afterward 
convene again for 
deliberations. 
(TWSE 
14) 
14 
AUG 
2017 
(TWSE ID20) Plans for continued 
investment in Laos. 
(1) Investment projects are too 
concentrated, high level of risk. 
(2) No specialized person appointed who 
can manage the land investment project and 
apprehend local policies on land use and 
foreign exchange risk.  
(3) Emphasis should be place on the 
company’s business and related industrial 
development. 
Material 
information 
published in 
accordance with 
the Law. 
(TWSE 9) 13  
SEP 
2017 
(TWSE ID12) Replacement of directors 
and supervisors in 
Subsidiary company R.  
[Veto] 
Recommend that all directors and 
supervisors in the subsidiary should still 
match parent company’s directors and 
supervisors. 
Material 
information 
published in 
accordance with 
the Law. 
(TWSE 
21) 
20 
OCT 
2017 
(TWSE ID31) Discharge of bank V 
senior vice-president D. 
[Veto] 
Because the investigatory proceedings took 
place in the financial holding company and 
I, myself, did not participate therefore 
consent cannot be given based on the 
company’s one-sided presentation of 
documents.  
Material 
information 
published in 
accordance with 
the Law. 
(TWSE 
22) 
07 
NOV 
2017 
(TWSE 
ID32)* 
Reinvestment in Company 
X. 
[Veto] 
Owing to the present lack of clarity as to 
whether the prospective electric cars shall 
employ a method of battery replacement or 
battery recharge, as well as an unfavorable 
outlook for the time being as to the current 
prospects for recovery of the company’s 
overseas investment funds, therefore 
objection is made.  
The independent 
director’s 
dissenting 
opinion and its 
reasons recorded 
in the board 
meeting minutes. 
(TWSE 
19) 
09 
NOV 
2017 
(TWSE ID27) Report of 2017 Q3 
consolidated financial 
statements. 
[Reservation] 
Keeping the reserved-opinion with respect 
to losses. 
Material 
information 
published in 
accordance with 
the Law. 
(TWSE 9) 10 
NOV 
2017 
(TWSE ID12) Discussions on 2018 
budget. 
 [Veto] 
Owing to on-site lack of previous years’ 
budgets and actual disparities in 
implementation data, determinations cannot 
Material 
information 
published in 
accordance with 
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be made, and it is recommended to invite 
outside persons to facilitate judgment and 
adjustment in order to make improvement. 
For this reason, disagree on passing the 
budget. 
the Law. 
Reconsideration of audit 
committee deliberations 
on the proposal of director 
E. 
[Reservation] 
The relevant facts of the motion are not 
clear; recommend that explanatory 
information be provided.  
Extemporary motion on 
the board’s prohibition of 
private persons making 
recordings. 
[Reservation] 
Request that the company verify the 
authenticity and completeness of recorded 
content; under the condition that directors 
have the authority to request the recordings 
from the company, I agree not to make 
private recordings.  
(TWSE 
23) 
10 
NOV 
2017 
(TWSE 
ID33)* 
(TWSE 
ID34)* 
(TWSE 
ID35)* 
New increase to amount 
of company Y’s loan. 
[Reservation] 
Request that relevant supplementary data be 
provided and proposal resubmitted.  
 
Once the material 
has been 
prepared, 
proposal to be 
resubmitted. 
New increase to amount 
of company Z’s loan. 
(TWSE 9) 04 
DEC 
2017 
(TWSE ID12) Reconsideration of the 
audit committee’s 
submission of material 
asset transactions for the 
wholly-owned subsidiary.  
[Veto] 
(1) Should be handled in compliance with 
relevant provisions on related party 
transactions. 
(2) Recommend that the letter of intent 
should be fully disclosed to all directors. 
(3) It is inadvisable to exclude any mention 
of favorable dealings for any potential 
clients; and, the best interests of the 
subsidiary should be taken into 
consideration. Recommend that the content 
of letters of intent to purchase from a 
potential client be sent to the subsidiary.  
Material 
information 
published per 
director request.  
(TWSE 
21) 
06 
DEC 
2017 
(TWSE ID31) Transfer of subsidiary 
General Manager F. 
[Veto] 
General Manager F should not be 
transferred; doubts remain as to the 
qualifications of the replacement candidate. 
Object for these reasons. 
Material 
information 
published in 
accordance with 
the Law. 
(TWSE 
14) 
29 
DEC 
2017 
(TWSE ID20) Plans for continued 
investment in Laos. 
The company’s long-term funds are not 
sufficient and there is not specified 
department to handle it. 
Entered into the 
minutes of the 
board meeting. 
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TPEx-listed Companies 
 
Year Company Date Subject Incident & Causes Reason 
Company 
Response and 
Action(s) Taken 
2013 (TPEX1) 21 
JAN 
2013 
(TPEX ID1)* Decision on whether to 
formally hire newly 
appointed General 
Manager G. 
 
[Veto] 
Newly appointed GM G’s inability to 
persuade the entire board on the operational 
plans for the new business unit and the 
necessary funds will create additional 
operational burdens for the company. Object 
to the formal hiring of GM G. 
 
Director H to act 
as interim general 
manager. 
(TPEX2) 07 
AUG 
2013 
(TPEX ID2) 
(TPEX ID3) 
(TPEX ID4)* 
Discussions on bank A’ 
consolidated credit limit 
application; 
supplementary conditions 
require two guarantors. 
[Veto] 
With respect to bank A’ application for 
consolidated credit limit, request the finance 
department undertake further investigations 
and discussions with the bank. 
 
Request for the 
finance 
department to 
initiate further 
investigations 
and discussions 
with Bank A’. 
(TPEX3) 16 SEP 
2013 
(TPEX ID5)* 
(TPEX ID6) 
(TPEX ID7)66 
(Remuneration 
Committee) 
Adjustments to 
comparison chart on staff 
salaries. 
[Reservation] 
 
 
(TPEX4) 26 
DEC 
2013 
(TPEX ID8) 
(TPEX ID9) 
(TPEX 
ID10)*67 
FY2014 budget: prepared 
forecast of losses in 
consideration of industry 
changes. 
[Veto] 
Object to the company’s prepared forecast 
of losses.  
Budget passed on 
a 6:5 final vote of 
the 11 directors 
present. 
2014 (TPEX4) 01 
AUG 
2014 
 
(TPEX ID8) 
(TPEX ID9) 
(TPEX ID10) 
Proposed increase of 2.2% 
to employee base salaries 
from 01 AUG 2014.  
Three IDs advocated that salary adjustments 
should be considered along with a change to 
the salary system from a fixed scale to a 
percentage increase of salary. 
Proposed salary 
adjustments 
passed on a 6:5 
vote of the 11 
directors present. 
 
      66  (TPEX ID5), (TPEX ID6) and (TPEX ID7) were not independent directors of 
(TPEX3) at the time the opinion was posted (according to the 2013 Annual Report for 
(TPEX3) the company had not yet set up independent directors). 
      67  As of the cut-off time for data preparation (7/28/2018), according to material 
information published on the MOPS, (TPEX ID10) was elected as an independent director 
of (TPEX4) on 26 JUN 2018, and has yet to revise the information registered with the 
MOEA. 
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(TPEX5) 12 
AUG 
2014 
(TPEX ID11) 
(TPEXID12)* 
(TPEX 
ID13)68 
(Remuneration 
Committee) 
The first transfer of shares 
of 2014 to employees 
through share repurchases. 
[Veto] 
The entire remuneration committee 
considered it better to wait for an improved 
transfer system and more favorable timing 
to make such a proposal; this proposal 
should be postponed for the time being.   
 
2015 (TPEX4) 20 
MAR 
2015 
(TPEX ID10) The company did not 
participate in the 2014 
subsidiary plans for a 
capital increase in the 
form of cash and NT$10.6 
per share for 24.61 million 
share transfer to company 
B’.   
[Veto] 
Comprehensive discussions could not take 
place due to the absence of 4 directors (2 
IDs).  
Passed on vote of 
a majority of 
directors, 6 
present, 5 in 
favor and 1 ID 
against.  
(TPEX6) 24 
MAR 
2015 
(TPEX ID14) Plan for NT$2 million 
donation to University C’ 
building fund. 
 
[Veto] 
Donations should benefit company 
operations and be based on the principle of 
raising the corporate image.  
Entered into 
reporting items 
for shareholders 
meeting at the 
request of the 
independent 
director. 
2016 (TPEX7) 21 
MAR 
2016 
(TPEX ID15) 
(TPEX ID16) 
Planned private placement 
of common shares. 
[Veto] 
Current company funds sufficient and the 
placement amount too high; threatens the 
interests of current shareholders.  
 
(TPEX8) 04 
MAY 
2016 
(TPEX ID17) 
(TPEX ID18) 
Upon the completion of 
the tender offer for 
company D’, the entire 
board should undergo re-
election. 
[Veto] 
The tender offer has yet to be fully 
implemented. 
 
(TPEX7) 01  
JUL 
2016 
(TPEX ID19) Shareholder request to file 
a lawsuit against the 
representative supervisor 
of company E’ (juristic 
person) for damages and 
apply to the court for 
provisional injunction.  
[Veto] 
The matter is not an urgent item and there is 
a problem with the notice to convene. 
Request to deal with the matter on the basis 
of corporate law and reconvene.  
 
(TPEX7) 21  
JUL 
2016 
(TPEX ID19) Changes to the place for 
the 2nd special 
shareholders meeting of 
2016 and  dissemination 
of souvenir gifts.  
[Reservation]  
 
      68 (TPEX ID11) and (TPEX ID12) were both independent directors of (TPEX5) at the 
time of posting the opinion; only (TPEX ID13) was not an independent director of (TPEX5) 
at the time of posting.   
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(TPEX7) 02 
AUG 
2016 
(TPEX ID19) CEO appointment. [Veto]  
Cancellation of non-
compete restrictions for 
managers. 
(TPEX7) 09  
SEP 
2016 
(TPEX ID19) Election of board chair. [Veto]  
Appointment of GM. 
CEO adjustment.  
(TPEX9) 18  
SEP 
2016 
(TPEX ID20)* Appointment of finance 
department assistant 
manager. 
[Veto] 
No material attached as to assistant manager 
educational background and experience; 
extreme asymmetry of information.   
 
(1) “Appointment 
of finance 
department 
assistant 
manager,” doubt 
as to there being 
no procedural 
injustice. In the 
future, the 
procedural rules 
of the board 
should be 
examined.  
(2) Per attorney, 
“changing the 
company seal” is 
not a major issue. 
Extemporary motion “to 
change the company seal.” 
Changing the corporate seal is a major issue 
and cannot be done as an extemporary 
motion; abstain from voting. 
(TPEX9) 20  
SEP 
2016 
(TPEX ID20) Convening of first special 
shareholders meeting. 
[Veto] 
Company plan for holding special 
shareholders meeting on 04 NOV 2016. 
Time should match that of supervisor’s 
convened first special shareholders meeting 
of 2016. 
Per attorney: the 
special 
shareholders 
meeting 
convened by 
supervisor is 
against the law.  
(TPEX9) 25 
OCT 
2016 
(TPEX ID20) Planned issue price and 
other relevant details for 
the second private 
placement of common 
shares in 2015. 
[Veto] 
Written objection. 
All present 
directors passed 
the resolution 
without dissent. 
(TPEX9) 01 
NOV 
2016 
(TPEX ID20) Extension and change to 
the payment period and 
date of record for capital 
increase through the 
second private placement 
of common shares in 
2015. 
[Veto] 
Written objection. 
All present 
directors passed 
the resolution 
without dissent. 
 
(TPEX7) 07 
NOV 
(TPEX ID19) On the company and 
current management 
 
[Veto] 
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2016 team’s receipt of false 
accusations and request to 
the board to authorize the 
Chair to proceed with 
relevant measures to 
litigate.   
No clear opponent; dissent expressed.  
(TPEX7) 10 
NOV 
2016  
(TPEX ID19) Planned investment to 
construct solar power 
generation facility.  
 
[Veto] 
(1) No detailed explanation of the factory 
location. 
(2) The company does not have personnel 
with relevant expertise in solar power 
plants. 
(3) Request clarification on reasons for this 
contractor and record of past performance. 
(4) Is there approved bank financing? 
(5) What guarantees are there against solar 
panel degradation? 
Chair to reply in 
writing. 
(TPEX7) 10 
NOV 
2016 
(TPEX ID19) Pursuit of compensation 
from former Chair. 
[Veto] 
Support request for compensation; only note 
that it is outside the authority of the board. 
 
2017 (TPEX10) 13 
MAR 
2017 
(TPEX ID21)* Distribution of 2016 
surplus earnings. 
[Veto] 
The company should take into account the 
future outlook and market vicissitudes; 
recommend per share dividends be reduced 
from NT$2.0 to NT$1.0 and cash dividends 
be increased from NT$0.5 to NT$1.0. 
Surplus earning 
distributions 
revised on the 
basis of the 
independent 
director’s 
recommendation; 
all present 
directors passed 
the revision 
without dissent. 
(TPEX11) 28 
APR 
2017 
(TPEX ID22) Review of independent 
director qualifications. 
[Reservation]  
Review of proposals 
raised by holders of more 
than 1% of the company’s 
issued stock. 
(TPEX11) 11 
MAY 
2017 
(TPEX ID22) Planned 2nd domestic issue 
of secured convertible 
corporate bonds. 
[Veto] 
The roll-out of the company’s first issue of 
debt has yet to be completed, there has been 
no demonstrable increase in the company’s 
business performance, and the level of 
relevant internal controls have yet to be 
clearly audited; oppose this item. 
 
Invitation for legal advisor 
to attend the 07 JUN 2017 
shareholders meeting. 
[Veto] 
Relevant information about the attorney as 
well as the content of service has not yet 
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been provided. 
Appoint law firm X to 
handle the provisional 
injunction for all civil 
claims by the person I’ et. 
al.  
[Veto] 
Relevant information about the attorney as 
well as the content of service has not yet 
been provided. 
(TPEX12) 11 
MAY 
2017 
(TPEX ID23) 
(TPEX ID24) 
Planned buy-back of 
company issued stock. 
[Veto] 
In consideration of the challenges in the 
company’s industry and a comparatively 
high ratio of debt, recommend the use of 
other means to incentivize employees. 
 
(TPEX13) 21 
JUN 
2017 
(TPEX ID25)* Planned handling of the 
exchangeable bond due 
date of company F’.   
Company F’ is untrustworthy; recommend 
to immediately assert the breach to the due 
date for debt exchange as a means to 
resolve the issue of repayment. 
Material 
information 
published in 
accordance with 
the Law. 
(TPEX14) 10 
AUG 
2017 
(TPEX ID26)* 
(TPEX ID27)* 
(TPEX ID28)* 
On subsidiary company 
G’s attaining distributor 
agreement for company 
H’s limited edition electric 
car.  
[Reservation] 
Should wait for the completed content of 
the distribution agreement of subsidiary 
company G’ with company H’ and legal 
signing, and then after the company adjusts 
the content of its distribution contract with 
company G’ based on the aforementioned 
distribution contract, re-deliberate.    
Material 
information 
published in 
accordance with 
the Law. 
Subsidiary company G’’s 
planned loan from Bank 
I’. 
Because of its links to the aforementioned 
motion, this case should be deliberated 
together in the next board meeting. 
(TPEX15) 20  
SEP 
2017 
(TPEX ID29) Hong Kong subsidiary 
increase of capital through 
public markets. 
[Veto] 
Capital increase should be raised internally. 
Discussion 
postponed on the 
two motions; and, 
material 
information 
published in 
accordance with 
the Law. 
Supervisor remuneration [Veto] 
In consideration of company finances. 
(TPEX16) 13 
NOV 
2017 
(TPEX ID30)* 
(TPEX ID31)* 
(TPEX ID32)* 
Increase to subsidiary’s 
capital in the form of cash 
to secure rights for 
cellphone game  
development. 
Request for supplemental data. Hold another 
audit committee 
and board 
meeting to 
discuss. 
(TPEX17) 11 
DEC 
2017 
(TPEX ID33)* Convening of special 
board meeting to discuss 
holding of special 
[Veto] 
(1) Seven-day notice period not met; 
violation of Article 204 of the Company 
Material 
information 
published in 
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shareholders meeting for 
the purpose of protecting 
company benefits and 
shareholder interests.  
Act. 
(2) Violation of requirements for TPEx 
electronic information postings.  
(3) Per the authority of an independent 
director, I, myself, announced on the 6th of 
December the convening of a special 
shareholders meeting.  
accordance with 
the Law. 
(TPEX17) 16 
DEC 
2017 
(TPEX ID33) Discussions on reporting 
violations of the Ethical 
Corporate Management 
Best Practice Principles.   
[Veto] 
(1) Independent director (TPEX ID34) is 
chief counsel of firm K’ and firm K’ has 
provided legal opinions about the legality of 
the company’s correction to the ex-right 
trading date.  (TPEX ID34) clearly does not 
meet the qualifications of an independent 
director and chair of the audit committee. 
(2) Company management has on several 
occasions prevented myself (TPEX ID33) 
from exercising my supervisory rights as an 
independent director.   
Material 
information 
published in 
accordance with 
the Law. 
(TPEX17) 29 
DEC 
2017 
(TPEX ID34) Fourth term of 3rd audit 
committee meeting 
dissenting opinion of 
independent director. 
The referenced case is being litigated and 
has no bearing on the motion being 
discussed, entering it into the meeting 
minutes would not be appropriate.  
 
(TPEX17) 29 
DEC 
2017 
(TPEX ID33) Concerning discussions on 
reporting violations of the 
Ethical Corporate 
Management Best Practice 
Principles, the setting up 
of the investigatory 
process and dates. 
 
[Veto] 
The law already empowers independent 
directors with the right to exercise their 
duties; there is no need for further 
discussion on this matter.  
 
Material 
information 
published in 
accordance with 
the Law. 
(TPEX18) 29 
DEC 
2017 
(TPEX ID35)* 2018 annual budget. [Veto] 
Target(s) should be set according to the EPS 
0.5 reported at last board meeting. 
Material 
information 
published in 
accordance with 
the Law. 
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ESB-traded Companies 
 
Year Company Date Subject Incident & Causes Reason 
Company 
Response and 
Action(s) Taken 
2014 (ES 1) 13 
MAR 
2014 
(ES ID1)69 
(Remuneration 
committee) 
Remuneration committee 
member ES ID1’s review 
of the company’s bonus 
system. 
[Reservation]  
2015 (ES 2) 10 
MAR 
2015 
(ES ID2)* Integration of the 
company’s business units 
and lean organizational 
management. 
[Veto] 
The current company organization structure 
has complementarity with product 
development and there is no present need to 
consolidate product lines.  
 
 (ES 3) 11 
AUG 
2015 
(ES ID3) 
(ES ID4)*70 
(Remuneration 
committee) 
Director, supervisor, and 
member of functional 
committees travel expense 
to attend shareholders 
meeting. 
[Reservation]  
 (ES 4) 09 
DEC 
2015 
(ES ID5) 
(ES ID6)*71 
(Remuneration 
Committee) 
 
Newly hired vice 
president of research & 
development department, 
special assistant to the 
office of the chairperson, 
and 2016 annual salary 
adjustment review for key 
managers.   
[Veto] 
Wait for the company to provide the salary 
range chart and all other relevant 
documents for further study and comment.  
 
 
2016 (ES 5) 14 
MAR 
2016 
(ES ID7) 2016 annual budget. [Reservation] 
Request that bimonthly audit reports be 
made as budget progress reports for the 
board.   
 
 (ES 5) 25 
MAR 
2016 
(ES ID8)* Coordinating the audit 
committee’s set-up for 
revisions to some parts of 
the Articles of 
Incorporation. 
[Veto] 
Carrying out the set-up of the audit 
committee without sufficient discussion is 
not advisable.  
 
 
      69 (ES ID1) was an independent director of (ES 1) at the time of positing the opinion. 
      70 (ES ID4) was an independent director of (ES 3) at the time of posting the opinion; 
only (ES ID3) was not an independent director of the company at the time of posting.  As 
of the cut-off time for data preparation (7/28/2018), (ES ID4) was still an independent 
director of (ES 3) according to the registration information of the MOEA. 
      71 (ES ID5) and (ES ID6) were both independent directors of (ES 4) at the time of 
posting the opinion.  As of the cut-off time for data preparation (7/28/2018), (ES ID6) was 
still an independent director of (ES 4) according to the registration information of the 
MOEA. 
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(ES 6) 10 
AUG 
2016 
(ES ID9)* Office expansion. [Reservation]  
2017 (ES 7) 08 
JUN 
2017 
(ES ID10)* Authorizing the board 
chair to handle the 
television and movie 
investments, each within a 
limit of NT$30 million. 
[Reservation] 
Request the finance department to assess 
the financial situation and the percentage of 
sales before further discussions.  
 
 (ES 8) 09 
AUG 
2017 
(ES ID11)* Commission agreement.  [Reservation] 
Re-open discussion after adding 
explanatory supplemental materials to 
commission agreements. 
 
(ES 9)72 01 
DEC 
2017 
(ES ID12) 
(ES ID13) 
Audit committee planned 
capital loan of US$4.5 
million for second-tier 
subsidiary company M.  
[Reservation] After adjusted by 
board to 
USD$2.5 million 
passed with over 
2/3 agreement of 
entire board.  
 
 
      72  On March 27th, 2018, (ES 9) announced the termination of its over-the-counter 
trading in the Emerging Stock Board, and all independent directors had resigned prior to 
the termination of its ESB trading. 
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